August 11, 1956 – Rugby Park New Plymouth
Taranaki 3 / South Africa 3
The Springbok team arrived in New Plymouth in high spirits after winning the second test and constructing an impressive win against Wanganui – scoring 7 splendid tries. There was a feeling in the camp that the tour was back on track and that the team was starting to hit form. The struggling performance against a spirited Taranaki team therefore came as a bit of a shock; a reality check.
Within context of the tour it was a match as important and influential as the Waikato game. The spirit, commitment and overall performance of the Taranaki team showed the way for the All Blacks according to Terry McLean and this had a highly significant influence on the outcome of not only the third test but also the series:
This match was, in fact, one of the great milestones of the tour and had a tremendously significant impact upon the third test at Christchurch a week later. New Zealand had lost so much face in the second test at Wellington that it was difficult to feel any degree of confidence over the matches of the rest of the tour. The prospect of a succession of defeats, of a calamitously anti-climactic finish to the tour, seemed unlikely to be disturbed by Taranaki which, being at the moment not truly of the first class, looked to be scarcely a hurdle, let alone an obstacle.
The vitality of the pack was extraordinary. I do not think I have ever seen so many forwards of a pack so soon get to a checked ball, or follow it up with such consistency. By any standards, this was great forward play. The Springboks were confounded and split apart by the quantity and quality of the effort of each and every Taranaki man; and the lesson for New Zealand, that the touring team could be jostled and hustled and put out of countenance was as plain as pikestaff.
The All Black forwards a week later were to accomplish wonderful things and to play with a fury which a New Zealand pack, playing at home, had not developed since 1950; but it was fascinating to speculate on what might have happened had Taranaki played lifelessly, been defeated by 30 points (as everyone seemed to expect) and shown none of the compelling power of forward play which made this match so memorable.
What made the effort of the Taranaki team remarkable and noteworthy as illustrated by the cartoonist below and as mentioned by McLean above is that nobody expected it. Nobody gave them a chance because firstly there were no recognized stars in the 1956 New Plymouth outfit with only two All Blacks namely Peter Burke (No8) and Ross Brown (No13) in the team. Secondly, and more importantly they were not one of the top six provincial sides in New Zealand and it was only really in retrospect that fans and rugby scribes realized that they were not as weak as most thought and started to take cognisance of at least three future All Blacks namely John McCullough (No12), Roger Urbahn (No9) and Roger Boon (No2) who had outstanding games against tourist on Rugby Park New Plymouth on August 11, 1956. They also had Ian McDonald (No1) who was rated as one of the toughest props in the country and an All Black trialist.
While everyone in New Zealand was up in arms about the defeat in the second test the Springboks quietly rolled over Wanganui 36-16 before getting pulled to a halt by little Taranaki who had Ferdinand the bull as mascot. Taranaki’s worthy three-all draw came as a surprise to most Rugby followers in Kiwiland and most certainly for local cartoonist Neville Lodge (Lodge laughs at the Springbok tour). Ferdinand had his chest boasting and Lodge published a cartoonist national apology for underestimating them and immortalised in the process the splendid performance of the Taranaki crop of ’56 into national consciousness.
|
South Africa |
Positions |
Taranaki |
|
Basie Viviers |
15 |
J Bayly |
|
Ian Kirkpatrick |
14 |
T Murfitt |
|
Jeremy Nel |
13 |
Ross Brown |
|
Pat Montini |
12 |
John McCullough |
|
Tom van Vollenhoven |
11 |
R Johnson |
|
Bennet Howe |
10 |
Bill Cameron |
|
Tommy Gentles |
9 |
Roger Urbahn |
|
Dawie Ackermann |
8 |
Peter Burke |
|
Chris de Wilzem |
7 |
H Scown |
|
James Starke |
6 |
B O’Neil |
|
Salty du Rand |
5 |
W Orr |
|
Jan Pickard |
4 |
P Joyce |
|
Piet du Toit |
3 |
Ian McDonald |
|
Bertus van der Merwe |
2 |
Roger Boon |
|
A Koch |
1 |
I Flavell |
Craven was the first to admit that the Springboks were lucky not to have lost the match saying afterwards: “We were beaten fore and aft. Had we won we would not have deserved it.”
It was in fact only due to a fortunate coincidence of a diminished in-goal area that South Africa did not lose the match. To accommodate a cycle track the in-gaol area was shortened from the usual 22 meters to only 8 meters and in the 25th minute Murfitt (No14) won the race to the ball dribbled into the in-goal area by Ross Brown (No13) and dived on it. The try was awarded but then cancelled when the referee noticed that Murfitt in grounding the ball had slithered across the dead-ball line.
The Taranaki pack in essence not only won the race to the breakdowns but also dominated the collisions in no uncertain way. Burke was a constant competitive nuisance in the line-outs and although van der Merwe won the tight-head count in the scrums it was poor ball as the Springbok pack was pushed around with a lack of respect for dignity and reputation that quite unsettled them.
However it was in two other departments that South Africa also came up short which prevented them from establishing any sort of rhythm. Ackermann’s attempted rushes at Cameron (No10) was blocked with cunning audacity by O’Neil (No6) and the Taranaki backline although lacking the pace of the South African backs tackled with ferocity and played with a cunningness that saw them take the honours as being better on the day.
Ross Brown a future All Back was simply dazzling at centre, first in his crash-tackles of Jeremy Nel and second in two extraordinary deft dribbling runs of over 20 meters. These rousing foot rushes by Brown and on occasion also by some of the other Taranaki players had the Springbok backs running around in panic like headless chucks. Taranaki’s special hero was Bayly (No15) not only because he scored the team’s points but for his outstanding exhibition of fullback play. The local teams inside backs Urbahn, Bill Cameron and McCullough had strong games and their contributions on defence and on attack complemented the forwards effort and kept the Springbok backs out of the game.
Howe slashed brilliantly through the defence on one occasion but spoiled a try scoring movement with a forward pass while Kirkpatrick made one thrilling long run in the second half but that was about it from the Springbok backline, writes McLean.
The piece written by Maxwell Prices about this match could be summarized as the four M’s. M standing for:
-
Mud,
- Montini (being picked way to soon after his injury culminating in him re-injuring his hamstring muscle to the extent that it was the end of his tour),
- Mixing and matching in the midfield during the match due to the injury to Montini,
- Motivation (lack thereof with the team already thinking about the third test) and
Price writes that the backline was slowed down by the muddy conditions but that selections made for this match contributed much to the Springboks struggling performance. The selectors picked the team with a mind on the third test but it was in particular -in his opinion- the experimental selection of the still injured Montini and Howe that hindered the Springbok backline in their attempts to handle the pressure exerted upon them by the Taranaki team.
Jeremy Nel had a shocker mostly due to the constant changes made to the inside backs during the match after Montini got injured. When Montini pulled his hamstring Howe (also in his return match after injury) moved to fly-half and Kirkpatrick came in on centre with de Wilzem going to the wing. Later with a rusty Howe paying very tentatively on fly-half Viviers posted himself on No10 with Kirkpatrick returning to the wing, Howe moved to centre and de Wilzem to fullback. Viviers made the break from the fly-half position that led to Pickard equalising try with only about 11 minutes to go on the clock but that was about his only contribution in the fly-half berth. He continued to kick most of the possession away especially after the Springboks scored the equalising try which says a lot about the teams mind-set at that stage of the game.
Pickard scored the Springboks only points late in the second half when he dived on a ball that were kicked into the in-goal area after Viviers made a break and got tackled.
Bertus van der Merwe was South Africa’s man of the match with 10 tight-heads. Salty du Rand started bleeding profusely from stiches he received after the second test but he Pickard and Koch answered fire with fire and was the reason why South Africa were able to secure a draw. Tommy Gentles impressed the crowd with his service to his fly-half behind a struggling pack and Kirkpatrick was still improving match by match and did enough to win a spot in the test side for the third test.
Taranaki went on to win the Ranfurly Shield, the symbol of NZ provincial rugby supremacy the next season, and then didn’t lose it until 1959, so they were much better than their reputation heading into this game suggested.
Yes, the 1956 Springboks were very unlucky with injuries, and their back line, when fit and properly selected was superior to pretty much anything any New Zealand team fielded that year. But the 1949 All Black tourists in South Africa had a better back line than anything South Africa fielded that year too (except maybe the 2nd test at Ellis Park).
This game against Taranaki underlined the fact that despite their many misfortunes, the Springboks had serious flaws, and didn’t deserve to win the 1956 series.
Just as the 1949 All Blacks couldn’t counter Hennie Muller and marauding loose forward aggressive defense, so too the 1956 Springboks couldn’t cope with the up-and-under kick and New Zealand style rucking.
Later that night, the plan to nail the tourists’ coffin shut was revealed, when the All Black team for the 3rd test was announced on the radio – probably the most important, fateful, and famous selection in All Black history. Included were the significant announcements: -
“Fullback: D.B. Clarke, Waikato…
halfback: A.R. Reid, Waikato…
No. 8: P.F.H. Jones, North Auckland…
flanker: S.F. Hill, Canterbury…
(and drum roll)…
prop: K.L.Skinner, Counties”.
With that team, New Zealand finally had the confidence it would avenge the defeats of 1937 and 1949.
Interesting to see the “Lodge Laughs” cartoon. Seems a bit hokey and corny now, but Neville Lodge’s cartoons were, like Winston McCarthy’s radio commentaries, one of the things that have remained strongly in the NZ consciousness from the era.
It was before TV, so you would listen to the game on the radio in the afternoon (if you didn’t go to the local game – in the pre-TV days if a test was being played in Christchurch, there would also be major provincial games in Auckland, and Wellington etc at the same time), then get the full report and photos and background colour in the Saturday evening papers.
They say TV is a “cold” medium, compared to a “hot” medium like radio – which I think means you are engaging more of your mind, and emotions, and imagination if you are only listening, rather than watching a screen as we tend to do today. You have to be more focused, and concentrate 100% of the time, compared to TV, and you are not just a passive recipient in terms of ‘picturing’ what is being brodcast.
Also, if you were reading a paper, rather than watching a TV news report, you could take your time reading the text and looking at the photos.
Which is why there are old timers in NZ who couldn’t tell you what the scores were when the All Blacks and Springboks played last year (I can’t – can anyone else without looking it up?!), let alone the selections, but the scores from the 1956 series – 10-6, 3-8, 17-10, and 11-5 – and the players roll off their tongues like it was yesterday.
Winning RWC2011 was very enjoyable for Kiwis, but there will never be a year like 1956 again – ever.
From what others on this site have said, I understand the 1970 test series (the last played in the days before TV) had the same effect in South Africa.
You wrote: “This game against Taranaki underlined the fact that despite their many misfortunes, the Springboks had serious flaws, and didn’t deserve to win the 1956 series.”
Nothing that one or two individuals or a good forward coach wouldn’t have been able to sort.
The two major flaws in the 56 Springbok team was 1. No real quality flyhalf and 2. loose forwads that were to similar in style and playing to loose.
Those two flaws culminated in inferior rucking ability and a backline that kept on kicking the ball away.
I reckon Basie van Wyk would have made a difference as he was pretty good on the wet field in the UK in 1952 (maybe a bit past his best in terms of speed but he would have been better in the tight facets than Lochner and Ackermann).
Pickard, Retief and van Wyk would have been a much better loose forward combo against the AB.
Not sure that the coaching staff really knew how to sort the inferior rucking ability of the Springboks. Craven’s appraoch was to play a different stylewhich could have worked had we still had players like Hennie Muller.
We also needed a fullback.
Hmm. Not sure van Wyk would have made that great a difference. Lochner and Retief (but to a lesser extent Dawie Ackermann) are remembered in NZ as very great loose forwards playing that mobile link with your back line/create havoc amongst the opposition backs type of game that Muller, Fry and van Wyk had patented in 1951-52. However, I’m not sure van Wyk was much different. They all seemed to be peas in a pod. Yes, he had done well in the UK and France on soft grounds in 1951-52, but NZ was a big step up in terms of forward technique and intensity.
I’ll buy that too much kicking at flyhalf was an issue. The 1959 Lions were one of the most brilliant back lines ever to visit NZ (they had the same effect as the 1955 Lions to South Africa), and as they were out-classed in the forwards, they had no option but to run it – and but for NZ referees, and failure to take their chances, they may have drawn the series, possibly even won it.
Even with their injuries, the 1956 Bok back line were similarly brilliant, but never reached their full potential – Wilf Rosenberg was picked “cold” for the third test after about a 6 week lay-off, and cut us up. Nel, Briers, Kirkpatrick, Dryburgh, were all vastly superior to the All Black backs – except Jarden. But ironically they won their only test by playing it tight, and picking Pickard, who was one of the few Bok forwards who was prepared to “roughen it up” in general play. He was a very foolish omission from the 3rd test team. As well as the Boks played in the 3rd test, and almost stole it from the All Blacks, the NZ forwards had control in the last two decid8ing terst matches.
Also the Bok tight five at the first phase especially – Bekker, Koch, du Rand, van der Merwe, Claassen – had a deserved reputation. But outside of scrum and lineout, they just couldn’t counter NZ rucking and all round vigour and intensity at the collision and breakdown. I’m not sure their tactics of 1951-52 were ever going to be successful in NZ in 1956 – especially once the All Blacks got their selections right.
Ackermann and Lochner was all speed and playing wide type loose forwards. Rob Louw like players while my impression of van Wyk is that he was more a Burger Geldenhuys type player.
The ommision of Pickard in the last two test matches was a big mistake.
In terms of the tight forwartds I also feel they probably did not have the rucking skills. So Craven options were simple to either improve the rucking by picking players like Pickard and Du Rand on flank with Newton Walker as a lock or to keep on trying to play the 1951/52 linking game. He went for the fast pace linking option probably because he felt the boks will not be able to match the AB rucking skills no matter who he pick. I think if he had van Wyk as an option he might have considered him because he was faster to the breakdowns as du Rand and Pickard and more solid than Ackermann and Lochner.
You wrote: “Nel, Briers, Kirkpatrick, Dryburgh, were all vastly superior to the All Black backs – except Jarden.”
Add van Vollenhoven and you have an great backline but without a general on 10.
Both halfbacks (Strydom and Gentles) were great but Paul Johnstone once said to Hansie Brewis when asked what went wrong in 1956: “We had no f****G flyhalf”.
The inclusion of Viviers above Dryburg in the last two test also part of the problem. Viviers best move in those two test matches was when he sidestepped out of the way of Peter Jones on the charge towards his try.
Yes, and a Springbok team without a flyhalf is like a chicken without a head. As we’ve discussed before, with the exception of Mark Nicholls in the 4th test of 1928, and until Grant Fox came along, Springbok No. 10s were invariably superior to their All Black opposites. New Zealand would often base play around the loose forwards, rather than the centres. So men like Peter Jones, Tremain, Graham, Lochore, Nathan, Kirkpatrick, Shaw and Mexted were the NZ play makers. Which meant No. 10 was not as important in the overall scheme of things as with most other countries. Often the No. 9 would be the senior partner in the halves combination, rather than serving No. 10. However, due to the changes that have happened in our game in the last 25 to thirty years, and a sucession of quality NZ no, 10s (Fox, Mehrtens, Spencer, Carter) I think most Kiwis would now agree, the essence of good balanced rugby is to have your general at no. 10.
So when Ulyate and Howe failed to give proper direction in 1956, it made things very difficult for the Springboks, and they failed to cash in on what should have been a clear point of advantage. Brian Pfaff was maybe the most crucial injury of all for the 1956 tourists.
I’m anticipating where you are going on this series with the above comments, but in the 4th test the Boks, seduced by the run-away and misleading win against the NZ Maori the Saturday before, picked Peewee Howe, and he ran into trouble via the prepared All Black trap of “mugs alley” (i.e., a seeming half gap on the inside that is quickly plugged by a big nasty flanker prepared to dispossess a skinny No. 10 of the ball!) all day long – until they reshuffled the back line. Ironically, given the discussion we had a few weeks ago about the mercurial Jannie Barnard, the same thing happened nine years later in the 4th and deciding test of 1965 on the same ground (Eden Park).
After the 4th test in 1956 there were two postscripts (in addition to, “it’s all yours, New Zealand”, and “I’m, absolutely buggered”!):
The Boks were so pissed off with Howe he had to get a lift to the after match function on the All Black bus. Also, when Bok captain Basie Viviers asked him how come he had played so badly, Howe replied, “at least I didn’t let Peter Jones run right past me!”
Yeah, that’s a fair point about playing to your strengths, and not being sucked into trying to out-match the opposition directly on their strong points. Is one of the reasons rugby is such a fascinating game, like chess. To the uninitiated it is a bunch of thugs smacking one another over with no rhyme or reason.
But especially when NZ and South Africa play, there are always so many factors in the play. Both have their unique styles, and corresponding strengths and weaknesses. “Styles make fights” as they say in boxing.
If you are small and giving away power in the collision, you gain an advantage in speed to the ball. If want to be good at the first phase, you may have to trade away some mobility in the loose.
…However, all the talk and legends about Kevin Skinner’s boxing ability overlooks a crucial point – he was a very good prop. Up to that point Koch, and Bekker, and Newton-Walker and even the young Piet du Toit had made a mess of the NZ front rows, and the dreaded spectre of Phil Nel’s words in 1937, “We’ll scrum it NZ”, were in the back of Kiwi minds.
Once Skinner was able to equalise in that area, the Boks didn’t have a sure platform from which to operate. Maybe the Boks had no other real option other than to try and repeat the tactics of 1951-52. However, they had three probably insurmountable difficulties in trying to do so: -
1. The 1956 team, even before the injuries was not as good as the 1951-52 team.
2. The 1951-52 northern hemisphere winter had been relatively dry (as had the winter when the Springboks toured in 1937). In contrast, 1956 was one of those “once in ten year” wet winters NZ has from time to time. If the Boks had been playing in South Africa with the tactics they used, they would have been very difficult to beat. But on softer grounds, especially when it got very wet and muddy, they were seriously out-matched – especially by a team that was made for wet-weather rugby.
3. As stated before, the forward opposition the 1956 tourists faced was far superior to anything they had faced in the UK in 1951-52
I don’t think man for man the All black forwards was superior to the 56 pack.
Bekker and van der Merwe was good in the frontrow and Koch was not bad. The locks was a very even match with Claassen maybe the best line-out jumper. Retief was an outstanding loose forward and Lochner and Ackermann was faster than any NZ loosie in that series.
It was technique and playing as a pack that derailed them and where NZ was fastly superior.
The boks only option really was to run and to stay off the ground by dominating the line-outs and the scrums. Skinner and Jones where the counters that prevented the boks from executing playing wide and dominating in scrums and line-outs. The boks line-out mauling was relying too much on bullocking tactics by the props as opposed to good technique. When Skinner started sorting the bullocking tactics the line-out mauling detreiotated as well as the scrums dominance.
Peter Jones took care of the rest by totally dominating the midfield; taking both Ackermann and Lochner out of the match.
“I don’t think man for man the All Black forwards was superior to the 56 pack”.
Hmmm. Not sure. I know that is a big call, because there is seldom ever a Springbok forward pack that is beaten up front, or is out-classed in terms of pure talent.
Put it this way – if NZ back play was markedly inferior to the Springboks in 1956 (and it was!), and leaving aside if you can the kicking of Don Clarke (maybe you can’t!), what other than All Black forward superiority won a series against South Africa for the first time in 60 years?
As good as the 1956 Springboks were in the tight five at the set piece, the All Black pack of the 3rd and 4th test is pretty much, along with the All Backs of around the mid 1960s (Meads, Gray, Whineray, Tremain, Lochore, Nathan, Graham) regarded as the greatest All Black pack of all time. They were the result of an evolution that had been taking place in NZ rugby since about 1928, when it was obvious superior Springbok size, technique, and innovation (3-4-1 scrummaging, and a kicking fly half who could keep the ball in front of them) had shown up Maurice Brownlie’s touring team and their 2-3-2 scrum, despite their excellent ball-carrying forwards like Brownlie, Finlayson, and Stewart.
In short, NZ forward play had become too loose, and that was drummed home to us in 1937. Danie Craven may have modified an integrated backs-and-forwards-linking-and-backing-one another-up game in the early ’50s, but it was definitely one that New Zealand had first brought to the rugby world with the 1905-06 team, and on to the 1924-25 Invincibles.
In 1956 they still retained that (Peter Jones, for example, was devastating with the ball in hand, maybe only matched by Frik du Preez and Colin Meads for sheer dynamism), but they had learned, and reciprocated the bitter lesson that Springok teams had been dishing out to them for years – you are unlikely to win at the highest level without control in the forwards.
I’m not sure, after the 1937 Springboks that there has ever been a touring team that has beaten the All Blacks up front – with 2 exceptions. The 1971 Lions had superiority in the scrummage, but only got parity in the lineout (by cheating) and in the loose, whereas the 1977 Lions were absolutely devastating up front (like you saw in 1974) – yet they lost by inept back play.
I might be dancing around on a pin head on this one, and I accept that man for man there were magnificent forwards on both sides in 1956. But unless you had participated in the grass-roots evolution of the NZ forward game as it had developed in the 20 or 30 years up to 1956, you had little or no chance of arriving on a three month tour and coaching your team to match NZ in the sustained vigour and physical intensity they brought to the game – at least once it left the first phase. There was just too much catching up to do. Craven in that book he wrote in 1954 prophetically alludes to a weakness in South African play at the time, where players didn’t have an instinctive ability to “do something” when the play had broken down, whereas he knew enough to mention NZ rugby players of all the countries knew precisely what they needed to do around the collision. In fact their whole game was based on it!
Also, I think you’ll find that while All Black flanker Bill Clark wasn’t a destroyer in the Muller/Lochner mould, he was very mobile, and constructive – certainly at the breakdown, and when the ball was on the ground – which you’ve alluded was a clear point of NZ superiority.
Amazing thing is we are now 56 years on from this test series, yet many of the issues we are discussing still shape NZ and saffer conceptions, styles, and planning. Put it this way – I can handle and accept Victor Matfield is the best line out forward in the world, and we are doing well if we can gain parity against him. Even if he wins the line out battle, that is not a reason why the All Blacks should necessarily lose. But the day Keiran Read, Richie McCaw, and Jerome Kaino are outplayed, or cannot be replaced by potential equals, I know the All Blacks are in very serious trouble!
I think we differ in how we see/define ‘better’.
The NZ players was -and still is to a large extent- better with regard to rucking and mauling skills and in working as units in the tight loose. They have better technique and understanding of what they need to do.
Rucking is the fundamentals upon which the game rest in NZ.
When I say the NZ forwards of 56 was not better as individuals I mean with regard to basic tasks like scrummaging, line-out jumping, strength, speed, size, tackling ability and so forth.
Let me reprase the NZ fowards were superior as indivuduals and as a pack in playing as a team in the tight loose, on the ground and line-out mauls. They were better coached since childhood in these aspects and had therefore superior grounding, skill and intuition when taking the ball into contact. They also had I believe a better undestanding of gamesmanship and tactics than the 56 Springboks.
So in essence I don’t think they had more natural talent but were better groomed and played better at the breakdown/rucks and mauls as individuals and as units than the Springbok players.
Yeah, you might be right.
I look at that NZ pack – Ian Clarke was a magnificent all-round footballer, who was a good scrummager, but could also run with the ball in hand, and, hardly surprising for the brother of Don Clarke, could kick off both feet. He actually drop kicked a goal from a mark from about 45 yards out when playing for the Barbarians against his own team, the 1963-64 All Blacks at Cardiff. Wilson Whineray whispered in his ear at the next scrum, “Listen, Chut (‘Chutney’ was Clarke’s nickname), I can accept you scoring against us, and I can applaud you kicking a goal like that, but please take the bloody smile off your face”.
Hemi had brilliant skills, as well as being a great hooker (although in actually winning tight heads van der Merwe might have been slightly superior). For example, the try by Jones in the 4th test was set up by Hemi dribbling a loose ball that had been slapped down at the Springbok line out.
Tiny White had magnificent mobility as well as being a wonderful line out forward. Duff didn’t have the same range, but was very good as a driving rucking forward, as was Hill, and Skinner. And then there was Peter Jones!
The Bok forwards weren’t too bad either. Koch and Bekker, in addition to their scrummaging ability were great with the ball in hand – Bekker played a crucial part in the try by Rosenberg in the 3rd test, and both had established their reputations as all-round forwards in 1951-52, and again in 1955 against the Lions.
Salty du Rand was a converted loose forward, while Classen was a bit like Duff – a lock who did the basics magnificently.
I think you are a bit tough on Lochner and Retief. I think in different circumstances and in a different team they had all the skills to be just as effective as, say, Piet Greyling and Jan Ellis who were so brilliant in 1970. But 1956 was not 1970!
Despite the Springboks’ forwards ability, the All Blacks, whether through natural ability, good environment and coaching, or the right game plan and technique for the series were superior. You quoted Paul Johnstone’s summation of the reason for the Boks loss: “We didn’t have a fly half”. He he he. Is a typical reaction when a South African or New Zealander is beaten to blame their own deficiencies, rather than give credit to the opposition (and yes – Kiwis are far worse than saffers in that regard!).
However, Tommy van Vollenhoven’s summation maybe puts the contest in 1956 between the two packs in the right perspective: “The All Blacls won because they had bulls for forwards, as hard as rocks!”.
Retief was great probably one of the best loose forwards in the history of SA rugby. I’ve got no problem with him.
Ackermann and Lochner must have been a joy to watch as well but I do believe the later two were a bit to loose and more suited for the harder South African playing surfaces.
Talking about Ellis and Greyling. Jan Ellis was an enormously popular player in SA. He had a dazzling sidestep but his technical skills at the rucks were lacking to be honest. 1965 was a great apprenticeship for Ellis touring through NZ but he never really fully developed in terms of rucking and foraging skills to the same level that you see with NZ loose forwards. Boland Coetzee was better in that regard but did not have the strength, speed and aggressiveness Jan Ellis had.
Ellis had the physique, speed and competative nature but started playing rugby at a relatively late age in South West Africa were proper coaching and mentorship were not really available.
Greyling was the silent assassin that actually made Ellis. Greyling was the true hero of 1970 with his work in the tight loose and never really got the credit he deserved. He never toured NZ but I think he would have been sensational in NZ; hard as teak with a unrelentless workrate.
I recently bought the Lodge Laugh booklet on TradeMe. Quite an entertaining read and I can imagine that it must have had great impact in 56 when TV didn’t exist.
I remember those days listening on the radio so well. You are right it required a lot more attention and focus; forming pictures in your mind was part of the process and the commentators was almost superstars; the way they described events determined what pictures you fashioned in your mind. I can just see how the Lodge cartoons in the newspaper the next day complemented the radio broadcast and how it became part of the memory banks of people.
“Greyling was the true hero of 1970 with his work in the tight loose and never really got the credit he deserved. He never toured NZ but I think he would have been sensational in NZ; hard as teak with a unrelentless workrate”.
Yeah – you get the impression he had great intelligence as well. I think he was scheduled to be the captain of the 1973 Springbok tour to NZ that got cancelled. I think I saw once he actually played some early season festival games here in NZ in 1972 – which were staged, ironically enough, as a fund raising exercise for the 1974 Christchurch Commonwealth Games (the one where Filbert Bayi of Tanzania and John walker of NZ both broke the existing world 1500 metre record by about 5 seconds – I digress!).
Ian Kirkpatrick was a magnificent flanker with the ball in hand, practically unstoppable if he got it two or three wide of the ruck and with a chance to accelerate onto the ball. Was a least a couple of stone heavier than Jan Ellis. But Greyling had more all-round skills, especially going backwards, and could read a game better. Is a measure of Greyling’s greatness that he pretty much out-played Kirkpatrick in his prime in 1970.