Who would be South Africa’s best loose trio of all time? The loose trio is probably one of the most important combinations in union rugby. The loose trio consist of three players with overlapping but also very distinctly different tasks. Each player has a very clear and specific task traditionally. The allotted tasks might have changed slightly in the modern game and/or the aligned task might also differ from one country to the next but in essence the loose trio’s effectiveness in doing these jobs as well as their ability to hunt as a pack determines to a large extent to outcome of the match. The loose trio are also the players in the team with the fewest set responsibilities (most freedom to go where they want) and therefore the position where the player should have all round attributes such as speed, strength, fitness, handling skills and good tackling and rucking technique. 

South African teams generally use openside and blindside flankers, we play the smaller, more agile or openside flanker in the number six shirt, while the larger or taller (blindside) flanker wears seven.

The openside flanker (No6 in South Africa or No7 in New Zealand)

Traditionally number 6 (open side flanker) is the “fetcher” and the player that helps with continuity at the breakdowns. Being smaller and more mobile as he starts play nearer to the potential action and needs to be the first person to arrive, and has the responsibility to mark the other side’s fly-half or in the modern tendency to hit the pods or the person bring the ball up. They do this by quickly closing them down, reducing the time they have to kick or pass.

His role on defence is to stop the opposition’s momentum when they carry the ball by disrupting, slowing down or stealing possession.

On attack the task of the no6 is to support the ball carrier when he goes into contact; mainly to help with creating forward momentum but also and probably more importantly to prevent the opposition from stealing to ball or slowing down the ball. Stegman does this very well for the Bulls when the pods goes into contact.

The No6 is traditionally also the more muscular player in the trio with strong legs, big torso and upper arms as well as broad hips and shoulders with a low center of gravity. Lastly, in South Africa we want our openside flanker (No6) to be quick over 20 to 50 meters (fast of the mark) with good anticipation skills of where the next ruck or maul are going to be.

Zinzan Brook had to following say about the openside flanker:

Think of the open-side flanker as your ‘rat-up-a-drainpipe’ type player, if you will, or the ‘groveller’.

Because defensive lines are so tight in the modern game, the open-side’s role is turning rucks and mauls into continuity play again.

It’s such an important role now, and that’s one area of the game that has changed so much since my playing days.

In the old days the benchmark was set by someone like Michael Jones. Back then he was seen as the new breed, the guy who forged the gap between the forwards and backs.

Jones created the continuity, he always seemed to be on the shoulder of the inside or outside centre or he was steaming up on the inside of the wingers to score tries.

But the guy who first mastered the new wave of open-side flankers was former All Black Josh Kronfeld. England’s Neil Back was another pioneer too.

The way guys tackle these days, they’re not always looking to just smash the opponent back.

At the tackle area or a ruck situation, you’re talking about a 50-50 ball, and often a tackler will be willing to sacrifice a few metres to get into a good position.

Their job is to then get the ball-carrier into a body wrap, pull him to the ground, get up in one movement and rip the ball.

Often the tackler will deliberately wrap up his opponent, knowing that eight times out of 10 the ball-carrier will be penalised for holding onto the ball.

Australia’s George Smith and Phil Waugh are other stand-out guys but All Black captain Richie McCaw has taken the game to a new dimension.

I wouldn’t say he’s exactly a step-up from Kronfeld, but he’s such a leader and has such a presence on the field which can change the direction of a game.

So there’s a real art to modern open-side play and McCaw has mastered it.

The blindside flanker (No7 in South Africa and 6 in New Zealand)

No 7’s role on defence is to mark the opposition No8 and 9 on the blindside and to close the gaps around the fringes of the scrums, rucks and mauls. The blindside flanker being larger has a more physical role to play at the lineout and may well be used as a jumper. He is the one that needs to make the hard hits and force opponents back in the tackle. In South Africa we prefer the blindside (No7) flanker to be leaner and taller. The blindside flanker has more of a ball carrying duty and better ball handling skills and flair (good supporting running lines and the ability to offload and put other players in space) is common in the No7 position.

Zinzan Brook describe the role of the blindside flanker:

The blindside flanker is the guy who cleans out the rucks and is primarily a defensive player on the blind-side, shutting down the opposition number eight or number nine.

He needs to be someone who likes that confrontation and physically robust approach, and of the three back-row positions he needs to be the absolute bedrock.

The role hasn’t changed much over the years, a blind-side flanker still has to make sure that the opposition doesn’t get over the advantage line – it’s his job to smash them back.

If it has changed at all it’s in the ball-carrying, not necessarily the off-load, but you have to be able to carry the ball to defensive lines and through defensive lines.

The All Blacks, for example, play a high-risk level of rugby these days, punching holes and then using short interplay to get in behind the opposition.

For this, the blindside and the rest of the back-row are often used more as three-quarters to punch holes because they’re bigger and can draw two defensive players, and if you can do that you’ve created a hole somewhere else.

My idea of world-class number sixes (7 in SA terms) would be New Zealand’s Jerry Collins or the old All Blacks legend Michael Jones.

Lastly, George Smith is a notable flanker who blurs the boundaries between the openside and blindside positions; he was mostly used as the exclusive ball-poacher among the Wallabies’ back-row players.

The No8

The Number 8 must secure possession at the base of the scrum, carry the ball in open play, provide the link between the forwards and backs in attacking phases and defend aggressively. Good handling skills are essential, as is a great awareness of space. Power and pace over short distances is crucial – gaining territory and field position for a quick release to the backs in attack. The no 8 is also the wider roaming loose forward that does a lot of cover defence.

The modern number eight has the physical strength of a forward along with the speed and skill of a back. The number eight packs down at the rear of the scrum, controlling the movement and feeding the ball to the scrum-half. A very influential position and is often used to attack with a pickup of the scrum. Normally tall and athletic and used as an option to win the ball in the lineout.

Like flankers they do less of the pushing than locks or props, but need to be quick to cover opposition half-backs. Number eight is the only position that does not have a specific name and is simply referred to as ‘number eight’. A number 8 should be a key ball winner in broken play, and occasionally a ‘battering rams’ at the front of rucks.

Here is Zinzan Brooks take on the No8:

The number 8′s duties are similar to his loose forward team-mates – to tackle, carry and provide the backs support in breaks.

But he also has the added responsibility of securing possession at the base of the scrum. The number 8 should have a psychological advantage over the opposing scrum-half, the little guys who are like big roosters!

The former South Africa scrum-half Joost van der Westhuizen was a classic in this regard. He would come up to you at the back of a scrum and say ‘I’m going to get this ball off you’ – well, that’s one of the nicer things he would say!

A number 8 has such an important role to release wingers, the fly-half and full-back. Personally I don’t think enough teams use the base of the scrum as an attacking option in the modern game.

You don’t necessarily have good footballing skills, but you have to have a good awareness of creating space.

When you’re looking at the ball at the base of the scrum you must have that innate sense of position, of knowing where your team-mates are.

Over the years South Africa had some brilliant players in the various positions.

On No 6 we had players like Jan-Boland Coetzee, Rassie Erasmus, Piet Greyling, Ruben Kruger, Schalk Burger, Heinrich Brussow, Corné Krige, Burger Geldenhuys, and Rob Louw.

On 7 we had players like Andre Venter, Jan Ellis, Juan Smith, Joe van Niekerk, Butch Lochner, Daan Retief and Stephen Fry, Theuns Stofberg, and Gert Small.

On 8 we had players like Gary Teichman, Tommy Bedford, Albie Bates, Morné du Plessis, Hennie Muller, Bobby Skinstad, Wynand Claassen, Doug Hopwood and Piere Spies.

A lot of these players have actually played in more than one position in the loose trio and the ones in red are players who have played numerous times in other position in the loose trio. In the above list I tried to group them in their best positions but a player like Rob Louw played for instance in No6 against the 1980 Lions and then on No8 in the first test against New Zealand in 1981 and in third test he was back in No6 while Burger Geldenhuys played in No6 in the second test and then in No7 in the third test. These sort of shifting of flankers and the No8 to different spots in the looose trio -from one game to the next- is often based on tactical manoeuvres and/or on certain strengths one player in the trio might have which the coach wants use in order to exploit a weakness he may have noticed in the opposition. Often players are moved because of injury to one of the trio and the new player that comes in can only play -or are better- in the position of one of the non-injured players in the trio; one of the original trio -who might be more versatile- is then moved to the other side of the scrum or from flank to No8. In 1956 Butch Lochner and Daan Retief were frequently rotated on No7 and No8 -from one test to the next- for tactical purposes.  

The question here is not who was the most versatile loose trio but who would be our best combination. In order to answer the question we need to determine what would constitute an exceptional loose trio combination?

Now that is not an easy question to answer and different people will have different answers on what add up to a perfect loose trio. After some consideration I came up with the following criteria.

The evaluation criteria

Classic role (CR) – players in the three positions should be able to do the classic tasks (as described above) required for the various positions.

Speed (S) – There need to be speed in the loose trio that is speed of the mark, speed to the breakdowns and speed over 80 to 100 meters.

Bulk, height, agility and power (BHAP) – These four characteristics need to be present not necessarily in all three but in the combination.

Domination of the breakdowns (DoB) – A good loose trio must be able to dominate the breakdowns against most teams. That is force the opposition back on defence and on attack.

Flair and space awareness (FSA) – The ability to run good supporting lines, read the game, be at the right place at the right time, to create opportunities by having an innate sense of where your supporting players would be and good handling skills.

Physicality, the ability to punch holes and to offload (P) – Not scared for contact in fact revelling in contact and good at taking the ball up with the added ability to offload.

Contribute to lineout play (LO) – either as jumpers or as supporting players.

Unison play (UP) – ability to hunt as a pack and to combine not only on attack but also on defence.

Background on a few of the older players in the analysis

There are a few players mentioned here which date back to 1952, 1960 and 1956 and I thought it a good idea to provide some background about them.

The loose trio of probably the greatest side that ever visited the UK namely the 1952 Springboks was Basie van Wyk, Stephen Fry and Hennie Muller. Hennie Muller alias “die windhond” is a legend and most people know about him and his exceptional speed, work rate and fearsome competiveness. The other two players in this trio namely Basie van Wyk and Stephen Fry is probably a bit of a mystery for most of the current generation South African rugby fans.

Danie Craven wrote about Basie van Wyk: 

“A superb team man, he certainly always responded to any call on his services. His hands were not wonderful; it was almost as if he first fumbled the ball when it came to him, but he never dropped it. Like his great partners Hennie Muller and Stephen Fry, Basie had speed, flair and the will to win. When I talk of the one I have to talk of the other two. They formed a great looseforward combination, the best in the world in their era.”

Basie van Wyk went on the 1956 Springbok tour to New Zealand but broke his leg and didn’t play in a match on that tour. Stephen Fry captained the Springboks in all four tests against the 1955 British Lions.

Basie van Wyk went on the 1956 Springbok tour to New Zealand but broke his leg and didn’t play in a match on that tour. Stephen Fry captained the Springboks in all four tests against the 1955 British Lions.

The other trio I feel need to be described is the Ackerman, Lochner and Retief combo of 1956. This was certainly a top class combination. Danie Craven wrote as follows about Butch Lochner:

“Butch was the best under-19 player of his year at Stellenbosch. The first thing that comes to mind about him is the 1956 tour to Australia and New Zealand. New Zealand were still sore about their 1949 tour to South Africa, where they had lost all four tests, in no small measure due to Okey Geffin’s kicking ability as well as the part that Hennie Muller had played as a roving loose forward.

They were in fact looking for revenge on Hennie Muller, who had done most of the damage and had dented their reputation rather badly in 1949. Hennie had retired by then and Butch, as a similar roving kind of forward, had to bear the brunt of the All Black onslaught.

However, Butch demolished their flyhalves from the line-outs. He could tackle like a demon, just as Jimmy White did during the 1937 tour.

It was after this disillusionment that they started with the up and unders, which nearly killed our players. Butch, unbeknown to himself, was in part responsible for this particular retaliation, because of his excellent tackling. There have certainly been few men who have tackled as well as he did.”

Terry McLean writes about Dawie Ackermann:

As fast as Deerfoot, handsome as a matinee idol and perfectly proportional, was once chosen, about three years before the ’56 tour, to represent, or personify, South African youth at a great Afrikaner festival in the Transvaal. He was somewhat susceptible to injury and having been one of the most prominent players against the 1955 Lions, he seemed somewhat careless over various matters. He was for instance, a lazy trainer and examples of his prodigious speed and wonderful defensive covering were liable to be separated by long periods of mooned about, recuperating. He was 1.91m tall and weighed 97.98kg and played lock at u/20 level.

Mclean has the following on Daan Retief:

Daan was good –er-darn good. In fact, he was the outstanding loose forward of the team and one of the finest of his type to be seen in New Zealand for many years. He had been a wing and could hold his own with most New Zealand backs. Though not so gifted a cover-defender as Ackermann, he had a hawk-like intelligence on attack and completed movements in a way that no other forward in the two countries could have matched. He was 1.86m tall and weighed 97.52kg.

There was certainly speed and flair in abundance as well as physicality in this combination. The only problem maybe that they were too similar and lacking the true fetcher in the combination.

My conclusion on who would be the best loose trio

So the winners, based on my analysis, are Ruben Kruger, Andre Venter and Gary Teichman.

In second place is Rassie Erasmus/Andre Venter and Gary Teichman.

In third spot is three groups namely:

• Greyling/Jan Ellis/Bedford;
• Krige/Joe van Niekerk/Skinstad and
• Greyling/Ellis/Albie Bates.

If you disagree go to the poll and cast your vote.

A large thank you to everyone who participated in the best 9/10 poll. I think the poll has run his course and I am going take off now.

In total 673 people contributed and cast their votes.

The results is a comprehensive win for Joost van der Westhuizen and Henry Honibal with 45% of the votes.

The rest of the votes panned out as follows:

2. Divan and Naas at 21%

3. FdP and Morne at 12%

4. Joost and Stransky at 7%

5. Dawie de Villiers and Piet Visagie at 5%

6. FdP and Butch at 4%

8. Craven and Osler at 3%

9. Fonie du Toit and Hansie Brewis at 0.75%

What a massive disappointment when I saw this morning that PDV and his cronies has been left in charge of our beloved Springboks. I feel agitated to the extreme, I feel like throwing stuff around in my office and house. The lack of balls by the evaluation panel is astounding.

However, after some pondering on why they made this decision I came to the conclusion that it was based on a dilemma they have with PdV and that they could acually not do much else. The final dicision has in my opinion very little to do with what was said –by PdV- during the meeting but with circumstances.

Here is the situation.

• Nobody wants to coach with PdV. Firing Muir and Gold is therefore not an option. Who do they employ as replacements? Nobody wants the job because it will be a career ender and PdV will still be in “charge”. As assistant coach you will end up in a situation that senior players will tell you what to do and you’ll have no authority. It will be like walking on eggs; the moment you push too hard you overstep your boundaries and you end up with egg in your face. So the situation is you either fire all three or you keep all three.

• They can’t fire PdV because who do you replace him with? Jake White is the best option because of many obvious reasons as stated in one of my previous posts but Jake is persona non grata when it comes to SARU. Jake has overstepped his boundaries with these boys and SARU would rather see us losing matches than employing Jake again. Jake has also pushed –in typical Jake style- to hard for the job after this year’s tri-nations.

The other options are Heynecke Meyer, Allister Coetzee, Frans Ludeke and or the Kiwi boys Mitchell and Plumtree. Let look at each of them.

• Heynecke Meyer is not an option simply because they have bypassed him in the first place when appointing PdV. It will be like admitting that PdV was a political appointment. It is one thing to have everyone think so than admitting it was actually the case. Meyer has also publically said that he would not take the job, at this stage, even if asked. He has also been out of coaching for more than two years and the game has changed over the last two years. I will not be surprised if they did actually test the waters with Meyer -before going into the reviews- and went into the process knowing that Meyer would not take the job if offered.

• The problem with Allister Coetzee is that he would in all probability approach Jake White and Gert Small as assistant coaches and they just don’t want Jake near the Springbok team. The other problem with Coetzee is that he will play a different style (Stormers rugby) and it took the Stormers more than half the S14 season to get that more complicated game plan right. The other problem with that is that the key players in the bok set-up like Matfield and FdP would be unfamiliar with that game plan and it will not suite them; forcing them into a Stormers game plan is probably not a wise move one year away form the WC with your senior players going to rest during the end-year tour. Furthermore, employing Coetzee without Jake and Gert Small would be risky at this stage especially because the province assistant coaches –which he would probably asked if he can’t take Jake and Small- don’t know the senior bok players and have not worked with the likes of John Smith, Matfield, Juan Smith, FdP, Gurtro and so forth. Replacing the senior players and the coaches at this stage –less than a year away from the WC- is not something you want to do. Also starting to develop a new game plan during the end-year tour without your senior players is a no brainer.

• Frans Ludeke had two good years as S14 coach for the bulls. The blue bulls is struggling this year in the CC under him which makes one wonder how much his success in the S14 relate to players like Matfiled and FdP. Frans would also push a too strong contingent of bulls and Afrikaans speaking players into the squad and that might be a fear in terms of the possible effect on team spirit and cohesiveness not to mention reaction from the ANC. Generally speaking the performances of the blue bulls under FL must have caused a lot of doubt about him as Springbok coach. 

• The Kiwi boys (Mitchell and Plumtree) is not an option one year before the WC cup because they will change the way the boks play and it is too late to do that now.

So considering all the above the best approach for SARU was without a doubt to keep the current bunch but to have a thorough analysis of the season and then to make strong recommendations on what the coaches need to do to rectify the situation including “forcing” the coaches to bring certain experts in to help with problem areas like the defensive system, the breakdowns and backline play.

SARU’s lack of balls is a huge disappointment but considering the situation probably the only option.

Andy Leslie –the 1976 All Black Captain- said after the tour: “South Africa is a country at war”. The tour was a disturbing experience for the New Zealanders in many ways and the unsettling nature of the experience is without a doubt the reason for the title of Terry McLean’s book on this tour.

Terry McLean entitled his book “goodbye to glory”. An interesting title and a choice based on the fact that this tour was in many ways an end. It was a goodbye to innocence in terms of separating rugby and politics for New Zealand rugby players because there is no glory in playing rugby against a country that treats more than half of his population as substandard humans. This tour was an eye opener for the New Zealand rugby people (players and administrators); the New Zealand nation and prime minster was severly critized; incidents of violence witnessed during the tour was disturbing and generally the New Zealanders had difficulty pacifying their own consciousness after witnessing the disparity in living standards of black and white in South Africa. As the teams prepared for the first test, in Durban, it was announced that Egypt had become the 29^th country to boycott the Olympic Games in Montreal –a direct protest against the All Black tour.

A month earlier, the Soweto Township erupted in violent protests against Afrikaans as a medium of instruction resulting in the shooting of hundreds of schoolchildren as police panicked in dealing with the protestors. It is incredible for most Kiwi’s to contemplate today that the tour to South Africa closely followed a day (16 June – the All Blacks played the first tour match against border on 30^th of June 1976) when 176 -mostly schoolchildren- died as a result of police gunfire in Soweto. By the end of the tour some 3000 black and coloured people had been killed or injured in the escalating violence.

McLean writes:

We 43 Kiwi’s who in one way and another were embroiled in the All Blacks’ tour -31 players, two managers, five press reporters, three press photographers, a radio commentator and a television commentator- heard only distantly and occasionally about the Montreal walk-out. Nevertheless, it was plain that many New Zealanders who supported the tour were shocked by the whole-sale surge of politics into sport.

Contemplating some of the millions of disadvantaged citizens of the country, disadvantaged because of their colour, looking at those places like Soweto and Guguletu and Mdantsane and so on where they lived, happening upon statistics as to the principal destroyer, malnutrition, of young life, comparing the glories of White Supremacy with the squalor of Black Inferiority, one inevitably asked oneself the question: are congenial relationships in sport all that one would want of the world?

So the tour was a cross-over for many New Zealanders; it was a goodbye to the idea that sporting relations can be maintained on the basis that sport and politics should be kept apart.

It was also goodbye to the mystery and glamour of the rugby rivalry between SA and NZ, for many New Zealanders. There is no glory in playing test rugby if you feel cheated by referees. In another book about the All Black Springbok rivalry (The toughest of them all by Harding and Williams) the chapter about this tour is called “Lonesome whistle blowing” with a picture of Gerald Bosch (see picture below) clearly suggesting that referees and penalties determined the outcome of the series.

Harding writes: There was discontent in New Zealand at the method of defeat. There was a belief that the All Blacks’ inability to win in South Africa had more to do with sinister Afrikaner forces than anything else. And those forces were steeled by the world’s increasing impatience with South Africa’s apartheid system. Rugby was the nation’s way of fighting back, and the All Blacks simply had to be beaten. Gert Bezuidenhout (the referee of the fourth test) is alleged to have declared as much. It is said that he told the All Blacks it was all very well for them to be upset, but he had to live in the country.

What an absolute pathetic excuse for poor refereeing.

The truth was that Craven, John Vorster and both the Afrikaans (Gerhard Viviers) and English speaking commentators immediately indicated that the incident in the fourth test should be a penalty try. South Africa as a nation didn’t want to win with illegal tactics. Gert Bezuidenhout with his remark left a lasting impression that South Africa as a nation was morally flawed and emotionally dependent on winning test matches.

At the post-match function –after the fourth test- Andy Leslie called for neutral referees in Test rugby, but the South African media were not slow to point out that, before the tour, the All Blacks had rejected an offer of neutral officials. It is sad that the South African referees could not live up to the vote of confidence they received from the New Zealand rugby board with this pre-tour decision.

It was an end to the glory of All Black rugby because of the disappointing results of the series from a New Zealand perspective. Compared to the 1970 All Blacks the 1976 All Blacks was disappointing, they lacked the flair and style of the 1970 All Blacks, and their tour record was disappointing. Like Brian Lochore’s 1970 side, the tourists dominated the provincial fixtures, but Leslie’s men did not invite comparable awe. A week before the first test, Western Province beat them 12-11 in a tense match that confirmed No8 Morné du Plessis as the right man to captain the Springboks (as his father Felix had done in 1949).

Picture of Morné and his father Felix du Plessis.

The 1976 All Blacks played 24 matches, they had been beaten 6 times, a dismal record, according to Terry McLean. Their aggregate of points, 610, and of tries, 89, compared unfavorably with the totals of 687 and 135 respectively scored, also in 24 games, by Brain Lochore’s 1970 All Blacks.

Jackie McGlew the South African cricketer said of the 1976 team: “Andy Leslie’s All Blacks remind me of our great batsman, Roy McLean. Roy was a marvel. He had tremendous power. He could tear the guts out of the other side’s attack. He was brilliant. You use to think, ‘God, how can I get this fellow out?’ But you kept at him because you knew –and he knew you knew- that he has a flaw. He wasn’t sound. His brilliance would let him down. As I see them, Leslie’s All Blacks are like Roy. Like him, they had dash and pace ad brilliance, real brilliance –much beter than anything we have. But like Roy, they weren’t sound. If I were captaining a side against them, I’d just keep on keeping on, waiting for the mistake that would let us in.”       

An accurate description according to McLean as the flaw was implicit in the team chosen by the New Zealand selectors. In particular the absence of a reliable goalkicker, deficiency in the vital position of fullback, lack of strong heavy men in the pack when they knew it was the heart of South African rugby, lack of real speed in the backline, the selection of Grant Batty with a serious knee injury, no real tactician on flyhalf, absence of strong leadership on and off the field and lastly not truly appreciating the importance of a solid halfback pairing.

Ande Leslie the 1976 All Black captain- the principles of free thinking and free speech which he and Stewart (the AB coach) encouraged turned round and bit them. Too many All Blacks on the field snarled about penalties and incompetent refereeing. At vital moments, starting with the loss against Western Province and especially noticable a week later, in the first test, the All Blacks lost focus because of getting mentally occupied with the referee.

On the last factor namely not understanding the importance of a solid halfback combination McLean writes:

The importance of halfback pairings has never been truly appreciated in New Zealand Rugby, and it is one of the grave and consistent weaknesses of the New Zealand game. Look at the strengths of Springbok halfback partnerships against All Black teams in South Africa: In 1928, wispy Pierre de Villiers and Bennie Osler, in 1949, Fonnie du Toit and Hansie Brewis, in 1960, Lockyear and Oxlee, in 1970 Dawie de Villiers and Piet Visagie. Great players all but, more important, great partnerships. In relation to South Africa, New Zealand has never had partnerships like these.

McLean is thus clearly, in his post mortem of this tour, not only critical about the South African referees and conditions but also pulls no punches when it comes to how he felt about the overall peformance of the 1976 All Blacks. The New Zealand media was vocal about the team, after losses against Western Province; the first test; Northern Transvaal; Orange Free state; the third test; the close encounter against the Quagga-barbarians and the controversial lost in the fourth test. This was not appreciated by the players and some spirited exchanges took place between players and rugby journalist during the tour.

New Zealanders (players, officials and spectators) were very critical of the way South Africa played the game. The general feeling was that there is little glory in winning test matches with penalties -and the help of referees- especially if you have excellent backs like Whipp, Oosthuizen, Krantz and Germishuys.

Alex Versey the New Zealand journalist writes of this tour:

The All Blacks would have played the South Africans into the ground if they stayed with the basics and did not fell into overly ambitious frivolous backline play. In the fourth test not one Springbok loose forward could come within spitting distance of any New Zealand three quarter.

The lesson for the Springboks from this tour is that they could just as well pick four Klippies Kritzinger’s in the backline on centre and wing with all the work that the Springbok backline got in the four tests.

If the good possession established by men like Kevin de Klerk, are going to be wasted for ever with compulsive kicking by the halfbacks then South African may just as well forget about the brilliance lying dormant in men like Gerrie Germishuys, Johan Oosthuizen and Peter Whipp.

McLean writes:

The fact was, as the All Blacks as experienced as Alan Sutherland, Ian Kirkpatrick, Sid Going and Bryan Williams could testify, that the South African Rugby at provincial level which the 1976 All Blacks encountered was immeasurably stronger than which the team of 1970 had so-so effortlessly overcome. To put the matter in perspective, and bluntly, the Big Four of South African provinces – Western Province, Orange Free State, Transvaal and Northern Transvaal – would on their form against the ’76 All Blacks beat any province in New Zealand, decisively. Transvaal would simply crush any New Zealand provincial pack.

It was true that the South African Test team was not so convincingly strong and that it was demonstrably inferior to the Springbok sides of 1970. There was no genius now, as there had been with Piet Greyling, the flanker, in 1970. Nor were today’s halfbacks, Paul Bavel and Gerald Bosch, in the same street as Dawie de Villiers and Piet Visagie. But perhaps the faults of ’76 were less in their players than in their selectors.

It was simply beyond belief that for the sake of goals the Springbok selectors would neglect a player like Gavin Cowley for so humdrum, if efficient, a machine as Bosch.

It was comforting to assume a stately air of superiority as to South Africa’s mania about kicking. But let us be thoroughly cynical. Let us ask how the All Blacks –and New Zealand- would have reacted if Bosch, or de Wet Ras, or Gavin Cowley had been playing in the uniform of the All Blacks and kicking goals like a machine?. Would the team, and the country, have reacted with outraged cries of “We don’t want to win that way”? Not bloody likely.

Perhaps the Springboks were superior man for man, but they did not play to their potential. The culture of Springbok rugby at the time, after shattering defeats of 1974, was defensive and insecure. Gerald Bosch scored 33 of his side’s 55 points in the series, but the Bok tactics were distorted as a result. They either ran the ball recklessly or withdrew into their shells. The service from the talented Bavel was erratic, and the sharp three-quarters beyond Bosch were often neglected.

On this issue and the role of Gerald Bosch in this series Chris Greyvenstein writes in his book “Springbok Saga”:

With the exception of that breathtaking first try by Germishuys which rounded off a backline thrust of sheer uncomplicated artistry, the Springboks hardly put together another worthwhile backline move for the rest of the 1976 series.

Three quarters like Peter Whipp, Johan Oosthuizen, Gerrie Germishuys and Chris Pope were neglected as either Paul Bavel, at scrumhalf, or Gerald Bosch, at flyhalf, kicked away possession. Bavel had an erratic season while Bosch lacked the delicate judgment required of an international flyhalf.

Gerald Bosch is a courageous player with safe hands, the temperament for the big occasion, and he is undisputedly the most successful place and dropkicker in South African rugby history, as a glance at the statistics will prove (this was written in 1977). His tactical kicking, particularly on a hard ground, is also excellent and it all adds up to a formidable array of qualities. Unfortunately, probably because he had been straightjacketed from the start by his phenomenal talent for kicking, Bosch seems constitutionally unable to play a balanced game.

If he had the ability to know when and how to employ his threequarters with snap and decisiveness, Gerald Raymond Bosch would have ranked with the greatest flyhalves in history.

The headings of the first and last chapters of Terry McLean’s book is called “Finish and klaar” and these chapters asserted to the same thought line namely that rugby between these two nations is finish and klaar; that New Zealand tolerance of the South Africa racial policies is finish and klaar; that the glamour of test rugby between the countries is finish and klaar because of poor refereeing; that NZ’s changes to win a series in South Africa is finish and klaar but probably most importantly that tours to South Africa is finish and klaar. There was one more lesson to be learned before the protest groups finally won their battle, but the All Blacks would not return to South Africa for 16 years.

In post mortem of the tour McLean writes that the most important contribution of this tour was undoubtedly the fact that that if was the straw that broke the camels back in terms of sporting relationships with South Africa.

McLean writes:

A profound change occurred in New Zealand’s thinking about sporting relationships with South Africa. It seemed likely (one couldn’t tell accurately) that before the end of the tour, two-thirds of the kiwi’s were saying, in effect, that as to the future ties in sport between the countries, only one phrase could be used – “Finish and klaar”.

The term “finish and klaar” derive from an incident involving Jan Ellis.

McLean explains:

When at an early stage of their tour of South Africa in the winter of 1976, the New Zealand Rugby team, the All Blacks, learned that a famous South African, Jan Ellis, had cried off from the captaincy of a multiracial side, the South African Invitation XV, which they were to play at Newlands in Cape town, they were disappointed. They knew Ellis well and admired him as one of the great flank forwards of modern times. The cause of his withdrawal, it was reported, was influenza. There was nothing much to it.

But then, only after hours after the match had been played, a sensational story appeared in the Sunday Times in Johannesburg. Ellis, it was asserted, had played refused to play with the two Coloureds and the two Blacks who by invitation had joined the 11 Whites in the team.

“Multiracial sport anywhere else in the world is OK,” Ellis was reported to have said. “I have played against and socialized with Fijians, Maori’s and all other kinds- but that was in Europe. When in Rome, you do as the Romans tell you. Here in South Africa, the same thing holds- and I am a White South African.”

Other Newspapers moved in on the story and Ellis, as his wife asserted, was “pestered” by reporters. Goaded, Ellis exploded. He had, he said, nothing more to say. With him, the situation was “finish and klaar”.

This striking phrase was memorable. Entirely South African, it meant, literally translated, “Finish – and finish”. The end of the road. Nothing more to be said. Bugger off.  

It seems that McLean is alluding to the fact that this was the feeling amongst New Zealanders after the 1976 tour. A feeling of South Africa get your house in order, organize your sport along non racial lines, start playing proper rugby and stop cheating or bugger off. Typical New Zealand style he just doesn’t say it directly but suggest it with the title of his book, the headings of his chapters and with a story line about unfair treatment by referees that runs like barbwire through his book.

Now this was very interesting for me, all this heee haaaa about referees, racial issues, unhappy All Blacks, Montreal games, Jan Ellis not wanting to play with players of colour and so forth.

I was 14 year old at the time followed the tour intently but somehow missed all this off the field stuff. Maybe it is true what Williams and Harding says: “The Afrikaners escaped the reality of the situation by watching rugby.” Maybe we were just so blaze with all the killing, shooting and constant fighting that we just stopped seeing it.

Who would be South Africa’s best 9/10 combination ever? When you talk about a combination you are of course looking at two players that complement each other in a way that make both better players. Each brilliant in his own right -able to play well with other partners- but at their respective best when playing with this particular partner.

It is more than just adding two brilliant individuals together; it is situation of synchronization where the weaknesses and strengths of the two players actually blend into something larger so that even the weaknesses are manipulated by the pair to the advantage of the team.

You are also looking for a partnership with reasonable longevity; a pair that played together at the highest level in at least 5 tests. In the modern era 5 test would, in my mind, not be enough but if we want to consider some of the greats of the past we need to bear in mind that it was rare for the likes of Bennie Osler and Hansie Brewis to play more than 4 tests per season; sometimes 4 during the South African test season (June to August) and then maybe another two or three test on an year end tour but often then with another partner.

The question is not whether the pair would play well in the modern game or in the 1920’s but who was the most exciting combination, who was a joy to watch and who could dictate and control a game the best.

According to my analysis Joost and Honiball would came out as the best halfback pair. However considering that these two played 7 more tests (than their closest rivals- Dawie de Villiers and Piet Visagie) and that the amount of tests counted towards the final score then Divan and Naas as well as Dawie de Villiers and Piet Visagie would top them if the combo’s were to be judged on rugby skills alone.

In order to fit the table I had to shorten my descriptors. Test = amount played; Kick= ability to kick with both feet referring to mostly line kicks, grubbers, tactical kicking and rolling kicks; Win = ability to win matches either with creating opportunity for others, dropkicks or scoring tries; Pass.=ability to distribute and accuracy of passing; Combo= combination play.

In fact Divan and Naas would outperform them in my opinion on aspects like dictating/controlling a match, option taking, being match winners, passing and the way they complement each other. Remember these values are the averages for the two players and not based on only one of the two.

This is of course only my opinion I would like to hear what the other bloggers think. If you disagree go to the poll and vote for the best SA halfback pair of all time.

In terms of the larger picture Gareth Edwards and Bennett was the best halfback pair I’ve seen in my life. Justin Marshall and Mehrtens was also right up there. Johnny Wilkinson was outstanding. His no 9 partner was also not too bad, either, but the fact that I can’t remember his name might say something about him as player or about my desire to know anything about English rugby players.

Lastly, Gregan and Larkham and the 1991 WC winning pair of Nick Farr-Jones and Micheal Lynach were also outstanding.

My choice however in terms of South Africa would be a close call between Joost/Honiball and Divan/Naas as well as Dawie/Visagie. Fourie du Preez and Piet Visagie would be my ultimate pairing in a South African perspective but staying with reality I’ll probably go for Joost and Honiball.

Best of all time have to be Gareth Edwards and Phil Bennett.

PS. I found these two qoutes that relate to this post. The one is by Chris Greyvenstein and is about Gerald Bosch. The other is by Terry McLean and relates to South African halfback combo’s.

Chris Greyvenstein wrote:

Bosch lacked the delicate judgment required of an international flyhalf.

Gerald Bosch is a courageous player with safe hands, the temperament for the big occasion, and he is undisputedly the most successful place and dropkicker in South African rugby history, as a glance at the statistics will prove (this was written in 1977). His tactical kicking, particularly on a hard ground, is also excellent and it all adds up to a formidable array of qualities. Unfortunately, probably because he had been straightjacketed from the start by his phenomenal talent for kicking, Bosch seems constitutionally unable to play a balanced game.

If he had the ability to know when and how to employ his threequarters with snap and decisiveness, Gerald Raymond Bosch would have ranked with the greatest flyhalves in history.

Terry McLean on SA halfback pairings:

The importance of halfback pairings has never been truly appreciated in New Zealand Rugby, and it is one of the grave and consistent weaknesses of the New Zealand game. Look at the strengths of Springbok halfback partnerships against All Black teams in South Africa: In 1928, wispy Pierre de Villiers and Bennie Osler, in 1949, Fonnie du Toit and Hansie Brewis, in 1960, Lockyear and Oxlee, in 1970 Dawie de Villiers and Piet Visagie. Great players all but, more important, great partnerships. In relation to South Africa, New Zealand has never had partnerships like these.

I copied these qoutes from my post on the 1976 tour. 

In a week’s time Peter de Villiers, the South African rugby head coach, will review 2010 on September 28 and will have to put markers down for the pathway he wishes to go down to defend the Rugby World Cup title in New Zealand.

The players are not at fault, in my opinion; they are the elite core that won the Super 14; the focus therefore has to fall on the competency of the head coach and assistant coaches Dick Muir and Gary Gold; team selections; and game strategies.

Clearly this trio hasn’t been able to accomplish a winning strategy. Why are we playing the bulls game plan and why can’t we make it work when the bulls did it so well against the same opponents? Did he really expect that he can win the All Blacks again with the same game plan and with the wrong players (example Januarie) in key positions?

It is true that the South African rugby team is gifted with phenomenal talent and it is true that De Villiers has provided a formidable team spirit, never before experienced in a Springbok side but there is a fine line between player empowerment and having players taking over.

Who is really in charge is a question that has been nagging me his whole year? Who decide how the team is going to play; is it he or is it Matfield and Smith? I would like him to explain how excatly does his empowerment process works when it comes to deciding what need to be put in place for the next game and how the team is going to approcah the next game – how exactly did it work on ground level in the last few games of the tri-nations? Who made the decisions? Who made sure the plans were practiced and properly executed? Where exactly did Dick Muir and Gold fit into this whole process?

Apart from that our inability to dominate in the scrums and at the breakdowns, the backline’s incompetence, indecisiveness and the lack of variation with the ball in hand has been a constant headache for me as a spectator and Springbok supporter. I would really want to know what new and innovative strategies did the coaches bring to the table this year. What weakness did they see last year and how did they aim to improve that this year?

It is clear that modern-day rugby requires modern-day futuristic thinking. Jake White brought Eddie Jones in at a key moment and that masterstroke probably won us the 2007 WC. In South Africa we sit with coaching specialists like Alistair Coetzee, Heyneke Meyer, and Gert Smal – who are familiar with the strategies of Ireland, England, France, the All Blacks and Wallabies- and there are international hire coaching guns or technical specialists, like Sir Clive Woodward, Ian McGeechan, Bob Dwyer, who are all potent and formidable students in the roster of coaches and the required style to win the World Cup.

We also have John Mitchell and John Plumptree coaching at the Lions and the Sharks, ex-all Blacks who can help us immensly with regard to improving structure and efficeincy at the breakdowns. The Springbok team management clearly needs to be overhauled and rejuvenated. I would like to know whether PdV would make use of any of these specialists and whether he thinks there is a need to use them. If not what plans does he have to rejuvenate the Springboks into a team that can deliver a tight multi-dimensional attack and defence strategy for both the forwards and backs so that they can fire on all silinders during the 2011 WC.

Was this year really such a massive failure and what did he think went well?

I would like to know what will Peter answer to these questions but most importantly I would want to hear what plans will he put on the table to make sure the overplayed senior players get enough recovery time but does not end-up stale and under prepared in terms of game time and match fitness at the start of next year’s WC?

If you were part of the review panel on the 28th of September, what would you ask Peter?  

There has been a lot of talk about quotas and how white players don’t get changes. The main argument being that it is reverse Apartheid.

To be honest I do get annoyed when players of colour get selected on a continuous basis especially if they are clearly not the best in that particular position.

Rickey Januarie and the way he got selected above Fourie du Preez (initially after PdV took over as coach) and this year above Ruan Pienaar has irked me to a point of considering starting to support the All Blacks. Now that is just extreme for me but provide some insight how I hate the whole concept of quotas.

The bizarre thing about it is that is a type of self-inflicted Apartheid. A situation where if you select enough black players (60% of the team which the ANC has advocated a while back) then you actually are almost back in 1976 when the non white players played for the Proteas (coloured players) and the Leopards (black players).

So just to make sure everyone understands I don’t like the quota system and think it is ethically and fundamentally flawed from any moral or philosophical perspective you take on it.

That said I do think that rugby players today have very little to complain about as compared to previous generations. There is an abundance of opportunities today in terms of both playing top level rugby and doing it professionally; that is doing it full time and making a living from it.

There is so much money and opportunities today in rugby that if you have any sort of talent you can make a fairly good living out of it.

Extended S15 and international seasons as well as enlarged squads now allow opportunities for upcoming players to develop and prove themselves. Rugby is no longer a 15 man game but a squad of 22 game. It provides 7 more players per S15 team (extra 35 players in SA) the opportunity to making a living and play international rugby. Then because of all the rugby, b-sides or developing sides have to be selected for end of year tours providing upcoming players the change to prove themselves.

Think about the number players that were unable to get into international rugby in the seventies. Players like Gavin Cowley and Neil Burger because there was no S14/15 and the international season was pretty short. That is apart from the fact that professional rugby didn’t exist.

Today players like Lambie and Elton Jantjies get opportunity to show their talent on Currie Cup level because the senior players play almost the whole season either S14 or test rugby. These youngsters get noticed by international clubs and are offered contracts to play overseas making large sums of money. Playing overseas doesn’t mean you are out of contention for Springbok call-up and expose these young players to mentoring and coaching by international players and coaches of stature.

In fact I don’t really hear these young players complaining. It is mostly the supporters that are doing the complaining.

On top of that you have the France and UK club systems which contract players and you have countries like Japan and Italy that will just embrace any South African youngster with talent.

I am sorry, I just don’t buy into the whole complaining thing that has been going on namely that white players don’t get opportunities.

Any white players that can’t make it in the modern set-up; with all the opportunities; with all the money; with the player support systems; with high quality fitness trainers, involved with clubs; with the top class coaches coaching; with the retired international players involved as mentors, will not have made it in previous generations either.

On the same note I think non-white players like Heini Adams and Chilliboy who kept hanging on at the same team -without getting play time- should get their heads examined. The only way you are going to prove yourself is to play and not to sit on the bench. Move away from those franchises and go prove yourself elsewhere if you don’t get time on the field.

So I want to repeat what I’ve said about the white players, above, but this time regarding black players not getting opportunities: I am sorry, I just don’t buy into the concept that quotas need to be enforced to make sure black players get opportunities.

To stop the practice of having players sitting the whole year on the bench and then get selected for the boks on grounds of skin colour, a new rule should be put in place. There should be a rule, I think, that if a player has played less than a certain amount of hours (per every 5 games or so for S15 and per 2 or 3 games for the Springboks) then he should not be eligible for the S15 and/or international team any more. So those bench players need to play or they get send back to their Currie Cup teams. This will put pressure on coaches to play the whole squad and ensure that bench players get game time. It will also stop the practice of window dressing that has been going on at certain franchises. You bench have to play so you need players of quality on the bench.

I am as frustrated as the next person with coaches and selectors picking sub-standard players of any colour but think that white players that complain do so with the white bread under the arm and the same apply to black players. Players have choices and opportunities, today; they don’t need to be victims anymore.

I can just hear the chorus of complains going up but it is at school level were the discrimination hurt the talent development. Quotas at school level might hurt a player initially but as long as the young player work on his personal skills he will come through eventually. I think winning is to much of an issue on junior level. The focus with juniors should be on skill development and not so much on which teams he get selected for or on winning matches.

I have personal expierence with a son playing in a to large squad and not getting play time. The solution was to start working on his skills. So while his mates played we had a whole range of skills we worked at on the side line. The up of it all was that he got his change eventually, in the right position, proved himself and was not subbed again for the rest of the season. He got the award as the most valuable team player at the end of the season and I got asked to coach the team next year.

White and black players can complain about the system or can they start focussing on those things they have control over.

I blog about rugby (mostly Springbok vs All Black tours) but Darwina’s latest response in which she refers to Basil D’Olivera made me remember this low point in South African sporting history. I get very frustrated with the ANC quota system and sometimes get the feeling that they just don’t care how well the Springboks do; having black faces in the team is apparently more important to them than how well we do on the field.

However, I think the national party was worse when it comes to skin colour in sport. Read Basil D’Olivera’s shocking story and decide for yourself. It is just beyond me how the national party were able to justify their behaviour in their own minds, let alone to the rest of the world.

Basil Lewis D’Oliveira CBE (born 4 October 1931) is a retired cricketer. Born and raised in Cape Town, South Africa, he was classified as coloured under the apartheid regime, and hence barred from first-class cricket. He captained South Africa’s national non-white cricket team, and also played football for the non-white national side.

With the support of John Arlott and the members and supporters of St Augustines Cricket Club in Cape Town, he emigrated to England in 1960, where he played first in the Central Lancashire League, for Middleton, before joining first-class county Worcestershire in 1964 and becoming a British citizen. By 1966, he was being selected for the English national team, as an all-rounder, and he was one of the Wisden cricketers of the year for 1967.

D’Oliveira played the first Test of the 1968 series against the Australians at Old Trafford, he was then dropped for the subsequent three Tests. He was recalled by the selectors for the final Test at the Oval and a century (158 runs in the first innings) against Australia seemed to have guaranteed his place in the side to play the 1968-69 Test series in South Africa. He was left out of the touring party under the pretext that his bowling would not be effective in his native country. South African cricket officials, realizing that the inclusion of D’Oliveira would lead to the cancellation of the tour and probable exclusion from Test cricket, exerted pressure on the MCC hierarchy and the decision not to pick him was felt by many to be a way of keeping cricket links with South Africa open. There was dissent in the press to this course of events and when Warwickshire‘s Tom Cartwright was ruled out because of injury D’Oliveira was called up into the squad. South African prime minister BJ Vorster had already made it clear that D’Oliveira’s inclusion was not acceptable and despite many negotiations the tour was cancelled. This was seen as a watershed in the sporting boycott of apartheid South Africa.

D’Oliveira was a successful batsman with a low backlift and powerful strokes. When he toured Australia in 1970-71 on the night after they won the series 2-0 he pushed his forefinger into the chest of every Australian he met, saying “We stuffed you”.

In 2000, he was nominated as one of 10 South African cricketers of the century, despite not having played for South Africa.

In 2004, a perpetual trophy was struck for Test series between England and South Africa, and named the Basil D’Oliveira Trophy.

In 2005, he was awarded a CBE in the Queen’s Birthday honours. In the same year, journalist Peter Oborne wrote a well-received biography, entitled Basil D’Oliveira: Cricket and Conspiracy.

In 2004 a stand at Worcestershire’s New Road ground was named in his honour.

This information courtesay of Wikipedia

There are four periods of extended misery in Springbok rugby history: 1963-65, 1972-74, 1996-97 and 2000 to 2003. The 1972-74 period was of course the loss against John Pullen’s England team and the dreadful series lost against the 1974 lions. The period 1996 to 1997 –the Markgraaf/Du Plessis era- was a time when South Africa was able to win only 4 tests out of 12 against New Zealand. It was also during this period that South Africa lost, for the first time, -in its long rugby history- a series at home against the All Blacks. What made it worst is the fact that South Africa was the reigning world champions at the time.

The 2000 to 2003 period was the Harry Viljoen/Straeuli era. A time when South Africa could won only 1 out of 4 test against France; 2 out of 5 tests against Australia. A time when the Springboks lost 4 out 4 tests against England; 7 out of 7 against New Zealand and capped it with a deplorable lost against Scotland on 16 November 2002 at Murrayfield, Edinburg.

It is very interesting that these four horrible periods in South African rugby history have essentially four things in common namely poor coaching; playing young and inexperienced players, lots of chopping an changing to the side, weak forward play and/or a shift from forward dominated approach to “running rugby”.

There is a 5^th factor which was common to these four periods and I mention is it separately from the other four because it a more elusive factor. Something that is harder to define or to pin down in terms of finding the reason why it was present within the team but most importantly it is a factor that is to a large extend -although not exclusively- a byproduct of most of the first four factors identified above namely the factor of team spirit or group cohesiveness.

In the first of these mentioned periods -1963 to 1965- the rot started when South Africa tied a four test series against Australia (which I wrote about here). That was followed up with a loss against France at home in 1964 and defeats against Ireland and Scotland during the 1964/65 end of year tour. The signs were clear South African rugby had problems. The 1965 tour started disastrous when South Africa lost two tests against Australia (as described here and here) on their way to New Zealand.

There was also the lost against New South Wales (described here) and in the second tour match in New Zealand a lost against Wellington (described here). After defeats in the first two tests against New Zealand South Africa had an appalling record of seven test defeats in a row as well as two defeats against provincial sides.

South Africa media lamented the weakness of the Springbok forwards, their reluctance to back up, their inept rucking and poor support and driving in the lineouts. In the second test the lack of defence and structure around set pièces (scrum and lineouts) led directly to two All Black tries.

The puzzle in 1965 was that the Springboks had excellent backs in men like John Gainsford, Mannetjies Roux, Jannie Engelbrecht, Keith Oxlee and Syd Nomis, and could draw on some considerable forwards: Rhodesian prop Andy MacDonald, who fought a lion with his bare hands and survived (described here); Natal hooker Don Walton; and legends past and future such as Frik du Preez, Tiny Naude, Jan Ellis, Doug Hopwood, Tommy Bedford, Hannes Marais, Abe Malan and Lofty Nel. Players of the caliber that would have excelled in any era, so clearly there was something wrong with the South African spirit not diminishing to any extend the fact that they were up against one of the all time great All Black packs.

It may be relevant that, in the country as a whole, relations between English- and Afrikaans-speakers had been somewhat strained since the achievement of a republic in 1961. The national party’s rigid separation not only of black and white, but also of schools for the two prominent white cultural groups, had had its effect.

For the first time in Springbok history, the fate of a series was less important than victory in a particular match, so anxious was everyone to break the losing run. In the Springbok camp before the third test, nothing was as it seemed. Hopwood, the Cape Town English-speaker who many believed should have been captain in the first place, was restored as No8 and unofficial pack leader. The controversial Transvaal Afrikaner Jannie Barnard, capable of brilliant but risky playmaking, replaced Natal’s pedigreed veteran flyhalf, Keith Oxlee. When Naude kicked the penalty goal for a 19-16 win, the relief was out of proportion to the achievement, indicating how severely a leading rugby nation had lost its confidence.

Ironically, the lack of Springbok leadership manifested itself in the build-up to that great penalty kick under pressure. As mentioned in one of my previous posts (see session 10 below) Gertjie Brynard tried to convince Tiny Naude to go for a tap kick and a cheeky attempt to score. Naude insisted on taking the kick and the result is history. There is no mention in any account -of this event- of a decision by Captain Dawie de Villiers.

It is my speculative opinion that statements –and subsequent events- about Maori by Prime Minster Verwoerd, in what became known as his Loskop Dam speech, shamed both the country’s rugby fans and the players who were on tour in New Zealand. They were creatures of their time and little was said, but to this day the sour after taste informs perceptions of the 1965 tour, which has become a backwater in the history of South African rugby. It was probably the only series this century in which the Springboks lacked passion as well as the necessary skills, and were, therefore, lacking in honour.

This is my final of 13 posts on the 1965 tour. The other 12 posts of this tour can be seen by clicking on the following links:

Session 1: The 1965 Springbok tour to New Zealand – the team and some preliminary thoughts;

Session 2: 65 Springboks in New Zealand – Arrival and first three tour matches;

Session 3: The 1965 Springboks on tour – matches 4, 5 and 6;

Session 4: 65 Springboks on tour – Southland, Canterbury and Buller;

Session 5: 1965 tour – First test, July 31, 1965;

Session 6: 65 Springboks – Reaction on the first test; Wanganui and Waikato;

Session 7: 65 Springboks – North Auckland, Auckland and Nelson / Marlborough / Golden Bay-Motueka;

Session 8: 21 August 1965 – Second Test – Carisbrook, Dunedin;

Session 9: 1965 Springboks –reaction on the 2nd test – Canterbury/Otago combined, Maori’s and Wairarapa-Bush;

Session 10: Third test; 4 September 1965 – Lancaster Park;

Session 11: 1965 Springboks – last three tour matches;

Session 12: 18 September 1965 – Fourth test – Eden Park, Auckland;

Next week I’ll start with the 1976 All Black tour to South Africa.

Ten All Blacks are off limits to their provinces before the end-of-year tour as the selectors begin their long-term World Cup preparations.

The rest of the squad involved in the Tri-Nations will be drip-fed into the ITM Cup if they are wanted by their provinces.

“Many of the players, especially those in the All Blacks’ starting XV, have had a big year with Super 14 rugby and the test season, while others haven’t played as much rugby,” coach Graham Henry said. “So we are taking a sensible approach in managing their workload as we prepare for the end-of-year tour as well as the new Super Rugby competition in 2011.”

The five-test end-of-year tour starts on October 30 in Hong Kong, leaving the All Blacks with an awkward interval before they leave. But it seems a few such as Andrew Hore and Isaia Toeava will resume playing then after recovering from serious injuries. Don’t be surprised if the likes of Sonny Bill Williams are also included in the squad for the end year tour.

The Super 15 Rugby competition starts in mid-February and the champions might play 19 games before those who make the All Blacks advance to four Tri-Nations tests and then a potential seven World Cup internationals.

Henry has accepted there cannot be a blanket rule about rest for test candidates during the Super Rugby series but he suggested at least four weeks away from the game.

Similar sentiments have been delivered by South African sports scientist Professor Tim Noakes, who said players, had to be managed through Super Rugby if they were to be at their best in the seventh World Cup.

He felt the ideal workload for top players next season should be about 17 games if they were to have the best shot at claiming the World Cup. He had a radical suggestion for the Springboks to stay at that level.

“Don’t play your best players against South African teams,” he said. “It makes a lot more sense to want to beat New Zealand and Australian teams. You have to beat your opponents if you want to be successful in the World Cup.”

That idea though runs against the marketing thrust of the new series with extra domestic pool matches.

Henry told the Herald recently the key to teams’ success in Super Rugby would be using and trusting their entire squad. That could be achieved by allowing potential All Blacks to miss games either side of the twin byes each team received.

“That is a logical way of looking at it and if players are out we think they should be out,” Henry said. “They should go away, get out of the rugby environment, freshen up mentally and physically.“

PRESERVING THE PLAYERS

Exempt All Blacks:

Mils Muliaina, Cory Jane, Conrad Smith, Ma’a Nonu, Daniel Carter, Piri Weepu, Kieran Read, Richie McCaw, Jerome Kaino, Sam Whitelock.

All Blacks available for ITM Cup:

5 games: Colin Slade, Anthony Boric, Liam Messam, Benson Stanley, Rene Ranger.
4: Corey Flynn, John Afoa.
3: Aaron Cruden.
2: Victor Vito, Joe Rokocoko, Israel Dagg.
1: Keven Mealamu, Ben Franks, Tony Woodcock, Owen Franks, Tom Donnelly, Brad Thorn, Jimmy Cowan.