All Blacks tactics released by Aussie media

All Blacks’ tactics for Saturday’s Bledisloe Cup test have been revealed by the Australian media after a photo agency snapped images of Graham Henry holding a play sheet.

The Age and Herald Sun newspapers both printed the images taken by Getty Images during an All Blacks’ training at Melbourne’s Trinity Grammar School yesterday.

The photos show eight plays drawn up for scrums and lineouts.

The tactics reveal that the All Blacks are planning to target Wallabies five-eighth Matt Giteau, who has stepped in for the suspended Quade Cooper.

They also show a plan to stop Wallabies’ flanker David Pocock influencing the breakdown.

I would like to see PdV and his coaching buddies gameplan drawings for their previous three matches, in fact, for any match they’ve played so far. I am prepared to venture that they don’t have any.

Leading up to the test

McLean and the rest of the New Zealand rugby journalists once again had much to say about the Springbok’s preparation in the week before the test. McLean writes as follows on this matter:

Training – the importance and fostering of. That could be the theme of the day. In the morning, the Springboks did a good deal of it. Someone threw the ball in incessantly. Goosen, newly and most deservedly capped, rose up at No3, du Preez at No5, Nel at No7. In turn all made the catch. Everyone else stepped to the right positions; and that was that. Meanwhile, the backs, under care of Nelie Smith, chased around the place and did a good deal of criss-cross scissors passing. It was all very proper and not terribly enthusiastic and re-awakened the feelings of early in the tour that these men weren’t working hard enough. There was certainly not much humour about anything; nor earnestness, either, for that matter. Just everyone going through a routine.

The All Black training session was in comparison, according to McLean, noticeably more energetic, stuctured and physically demanding with a lot more fun and emotional involvement by both players and coaches. McLean relate how, during lunch, a conversation unfolded -between All Black players and the media- regarding the lethargic training methods of the Springboks. Speculatively, the conversation moved into the direction of wondering whether the Springboks’ unwillingness to train really hard accounts for their poor success rate so far on tour and for the apparent extra weight some of the South African players seems to be carrying.

The All Black coach Neil McPhail was concerned about over confidence and as a caution against super-optimism got the team together to express his concerns and to warn them against the dangers of being to sure of themselves. In support Colin Meads testified that in comparison with his dream easy encounter with Naude, in the first test, he found Goosen –who was selceted for the second test- in the subsequent game, a lot tougher and much more challenging. He also pointed to the fact that in spite of New Zealand donimating the first test there was only 3 points difference between the two teams, at the end.

Abie Malan (on the left with the head gear) and Piet Goosen in the lineout during the second test. Tremain the All Black flanker –who scored the first try in this test- can be seen between Malan and Goosen.

The Springbok team for the test were:

 
Wilson; Engelbrecht; Gainsford; Roux, Brynard; Oxlee; Smith (Captain); Nel; Schoeman; du Preez; Goosen; Ellis; MacDonald; Malan; Van Zyl. Nelie Smith again played in place of Dawie de Villiers who left the field concussed in the last match – against Auckland- before the 2^nd test.

 
The New Zealand selectors made only one change to the team that won the first test. Ray Moreton was brought on inside centre (second five-eight) in place of John Collins. The team can be seen here.

 
21 August 1965 – New Zealand 13, South Africa 0.

Players standing at attention during the playing of the national anthems before the start of the second test. 

 
Heavy rain fell non-stop for 24 hours leading up to the match. The field was consequently a mud bath making the game a messy affair in many ways. The backline play was messy, the lineouts were messy, the scrums were messy and the players were messy mud plasterd wresling phantoms by halftime. The wet, greasy playing surface also eliminated the Springboks main attacking weapon namely their dangerous backline. Unforced handling errors and scrappy/sloppy frantic struggles to control the slippery ball was typical in both teams –more so in the Springbok side.

 
Oxlee knocked the ball several times at No10 and was clearly totally out of his depth in the mud. Murdoch the NZ No10 also had difficulty catching the muddy slippery ball on one or two occasions but generally had a significantly better game mainly because he ran with speed onto the ball. Oxlee in contrast was tentative and hesitant and often spun round 180 degrees in process of catching the ball because he caught it with his arms and not with his hands.

Oxlee getting ready to kick for touch after a penalty. Oxlee didn’t have a happy match; he was unsure, hesitant and clearly out of his depth in the mud. The other Springboks in the photo is from left to right, Lofty Nel, Piet Goosen, Oxlee with the ball, Sakkie van Zyl, Abie Malan with the head gear, Macdonald diagonally behind Abie, Frik du Preez with hands on knees and Gertjie Brynard. 

 
The few times the ball was despatched down the Springbok backline –and not knocked on- Gainsford looked dangerous; he was fast, ran straight and on at least two occations breaked away in such a way that it could have lead to tries if the last pass didn’t went astray. Mannetjies Roux –like the rest of the backline- didn’t get much opportunity but on the two or three occasions that the ball did go to him he had an unsettling effect on the backline; running either not straight or clinging too long onto the ball -trying to do to much- instead of just shifting the ball.

Nelie Smith was under tremendous pressure behind the scrums and lineouts. New Zealand’s primary tactic was to storm through the lineouts and scrums and spoil. Smith was caught 90% of the times behind the scrums and lineouts for several reasons including the fact that he was not nimble enough, the fact that the Springboks tapped the ball in the lineout and were pushed back in the scrums. The All Blacks’ first try came when Smith was bustled behind the scrum on the Sprigboks goal line by Laidlaw; the ball slipped out of Smith’s grip as he was about to pass it and rolled backwards in the direction of Oxlee waiting deep in the in goal area, Tremain came from the opposite side of the scrum and fell on the ball.

Schoeman, van Zyl and Whineray wrestling for the ball in a lineout during the second test. Notice how Whineray is holding van Zyl’s arms down so he can’t compete.

I saw Frik du Preez catching the ball only once –during the whole match- with both hands and then messing it up by placing the ball to early on the ground –while Springboks were getting driven backwards.The result was that the ball was once again booted upfield by one of the All Black flankers when Nelie Smith fumbled the greasy ball.

One of the few times that Frik du Preez actually caught the ball with both hands in the lineout. Note how the New Zealand forwards are already starting to drive forward while none of the Springboks are even in position, to either support Frik or to drive in on the ball. Shortly after the photo was taken, Frik placed the ball on the ground and the Springboks were driven back past the ball –which spilled side ways- allowing one of the All Black flankers to boot the ball meters far in the direction of the Springboks goal line.

The Springboks were too upright in the scrums and almost all the tight forwards scrumed with bended backs while the New Zealand pack maintained low body posistions and pushed at a 45 degree angle upwards in the scrums. The scrums (as the photo below show) was much less structured and organized than today. It was literally a case that once the scrum has been called, by the referee, the first two or three tight forwards (sometimes the front row and hooker from one team and the loose head or tighthead prop from the other team) at the scene would begin to form the scrum while the rest of the forwards would join in as they arrive. Depending on who started with the most forwards the scrum will move one way and then the otherway as more of the other team might arrive and join in. Forward backward the scrum will move until the all the forwards of both teams are in the scrum at which point the All Blacks would start pushing the Springbok pack backwards because they maintained better body posistions in the scrum. Usually more of the All Blacks pack would arrived first at the scrum providing them with forward momentum right from the onset.

Note how the props are busy starting the scrum while the rest of the tight forwards -of both teams- are still arriving. Note how curved or round the backs of the Springbok props are in comaprison with NZ props on the left. Look also at the props hips, knees and foot positions. The Springbok props are falling/leaning forward into the scrum with bended backs while the NZ props have their legs under them ready to thrust forward and upward; their feet are on the move while the Springboks’ feet are anchored. Note also how the Springbok locks and eightman enter the scrum from top to bottom with the head ending lower than hips. In comparison the All Black locks are starting to bend their knee’s in preparation to enter the scrum; they would therefore enter with their heads higher that their hips giving them straight backs and more thrust.

Terry McLean writes as follows about the lineouts and scrums in this test:

At the lineout, whether from a tapped ball or because of missing links in the defensive wall, the Springboks permitted the All Blacks to harass Smith, positively to prey upon him. At the scrummage, they let the ball go to Smith and so encouraged the All Blacks, especially Tremain, Conway, Colin Meads and, less effectively, Lochore, to harass the poor man again, harass him so much that there wasn’t a chance of his putting defensive punts into All Black territory or making effective clearing passes to Oxlee. Everything as to the winning –and losing- of the match turned upon this dreadfully severe and consistent plaguing of poor Nelie. In permitting it to occur and recur Smith, let’s face it, was ingenuous in his captaincy.

McLean writes as follows about the negative or “spoiling tactics” of NZ in 1965:

They (the players) are the children of New Zealand rugby –the rugby which is distinguished even at secondary school level, by careful, shrewd, chanceless play, with the touchline always a ready haven and the backs, certainly at representative level, restricted to the snapping-up of trifles rather than the production of thoughtful, calculated attacks at the weak links or men of the opposing side.

On individual performances specific reference is made of Lionel Wilson. The wet conditions fitted Wilson –not a running fulback on his best of days- like a glove. The constant hoofing of the South African scrums and lineouts ball by the New Zealand forwards brought Wilson right into the game, testing his positional play and ability to handle the wet muddy conditions. Wilson, however, was solid as a rock and did not put a foot wrong during the game. McLean writes as follows about Wilson:

Not many New Zealanders, up till now, had placed Wilson very high among fullbacks. They had thought that his fielding clean and his right-footed punting sound, but as against this they were most critical of his nervous attitude, his painstaking preparation for defensive kicks with the left foot, his susceptibility to injury. As the two teams surged over the slush of Carisbrook, all criticisms were forgotten. The man was miraculous. His touch in fielding was superb, his kicking long and accurate, his courage faultless, his positional play ideal. This was assuredly one of the great fullback games of South Africa-New Zealand history.

Goosen, du Preez, Ellis, MacDonald and Van Zyl tried hard, the All Black forwards were, however, clearly better on the day with better technique in the slush.

Ellis is one of the Springboks who tried hard. Here he charges onto Rangi (first photo) and past Lochore (second photo).

Run of the game 

McLoad scores New Zealand’s second try after he kicked a ball that went loose into the Springboks ingoal area and won the race to the ball.

Murdoch, the All Black No10 running with speed onto the ball. He played with lot more confidence in the wet conditions than Oxlee and it was mainly due to the way that he ran with speed onto the ball that created Rangi’s try.

Ron Rangi scoring New Zealand’s third try after a fine backline move.

The general feeling was that the foundation for the NZ victory was laid by the NZ pack; they outplayed the Springboks forwards in all departments. NZ was better in the scrums, although the scrum was not much of a contest in the wet conditions. The lineout was generally speaking a mess, but NZ did the basics better namely caught the ball more often with two hands and secured the ball more efficiently by driving in on the ball catcher.

Laidlaw handled the wet conditions much better than Nelie Smith and kept his forwards on the front foot with well placed punts just over the lineouts and scrums. Th punts were so placed that the Springbok wingers Brynard and Engelbrecht had to turn around and scamper desperately to get the ball over the sideline.

It was the first time that the All Blacks won the second test of a series (against South Africa) in New Zealand. The referee Mr. Pat Murphy pulled his hamsting halfway through the the second half. After treatment he was able to complete the match with a marked limp.

Isn’t Zane just a dead ringer for Sideshow Bob from the Simpsons? It is not only the hair but check out the mouth, chin and eyes!

Maybe the appropriate name for Zane could be Sideshow Zane?  

South Africa lost the first two tri-nations matches in NZ at the breakdowns in my opinion. We were totally annihilated at the breakdowns both on attack and on defence. This intrigued so I’ve been pondering about this issue since Saturday and it was the main topic of my conversations with Kiwi’s whenever we talked about the rugby. Thing that I wanted to figure is what exactly made the difference; what did the AB do at the breakdowns that made them so much better?

Some of the most clearly observable factors were the AB’s speed of the line; making sure they make contact on our side of the advantage line; making sure they were going more forceful into contact than the Springboks. Another clear factor was that they had more numbers committing to the breakdowns; essentially blowing us over with numbers, speed and explosive hits. There was however more; some less clearly observable things they did which made one hell of a difference and no it was not using illegal tactics for which they didn’t get penalised.

Note the following remarks from Owen Franks:

“Everyone knows the South Africans are big guys. Once they get some steam on they’re pretty strong runners.

“So the easiest way is just to kamikaze yourself at the knees,” he said.

“Getting them behind their advantage line just makes a huge difference. We were putting everything into those tackles and trying to dominate.”

There is much to be read in his word “Kamikaze yourself at the knees” and “putting everything into the tackles and trying to dominate”.

They hunted in pairs first defender goes for the knees making sure he knocks the attacker down which means the second player can stay upright (doesn’t need to go to the ground) and can get his hands on the ball; forcing either a penalty or preventing the Springbok to place the ball.

The next arrivals made sure the AB dominate by driving over the ball; this is in essence how they stopped our momentum. Hitting low making sure the first tackler doesn’t end-up in a wrestling contest and making sure that there are always two players at the tackle situation namely one low and the next one high. Task of the first one is to make sure the ball carrier goes down while the task of the second defender is to get his hands on the ball (sometimes while the attackers is still on his way down).

Now it didn’t always pan out exactly like that but if your intent is to have two defenders on a ball carrier -each one with a certain task in terms of stopping flow, creating turnover and dominating- then even if the second player is a fraction late he has a certain urgency to get to the point of contact and he knows exactly what to do once he gets there namely getting his hands on the ball (to stop the ball to get placed and be recycled by the opposition). And that is enough because the incoming support is going to blow him over the ball meaning he doesn’t need to dislodge the ball to win it.

According to one of the local coaches I’ve talked to this is the latest strategy that is aggressively enforced and practiced on all levels in New Zealand rugby.

On attack the strategy was firstly take the defenders off their feet which means the defender(s) then had to release the ball allowing the ball carrier to place the ball; it also allowed the needed time for the cavalry to arrive and drive over the ball.

Two Springboks going down in the tackle with McCaw in support to secure the ball.

When faced with two defenders they attacked space namely running in between the two defenders which take both of them out of the contest at the breakdown because the intent is to take both defenders down. In this way they made sure (or at least attempted) that there was no Springbok on his feet at the point of collision.

Ranger running inbetween two defenders and forcing them backwards with strong leg work and looking down which shows his intent to take both of them down.

The boks played a lot beter than last week. Our scrum went beter, they won the lineout battle and there were more urgency overall. However I would narrow the loss down to three major areas.

1. Bakkies Botha en the referee
2. Team selection
3. The breakdown

Bakkies Botha and the referee

I know Bakkies didn’t play but the yellow card was the result of his legacy. The referee was scared shitless that this match would become an uncontrollable tug-push-scuff-hit and-retaliation battle. He consequently decided before the match that he is going to yellow card the first player in green that overstep with regard to any of those things and ruined in the process a match that could have been a great one.

For me it was all over the moment the referee dished out that yellow card. Not only did it cost us 10 points but it took all the aggression out of the boks. They were scared to do anything and in fact my feeling on the sideline was that the boks should start to bliksem every All Black in sight and that they should keep that up until the asshole sin bin and red card the whole team. Yes I know it is a bit of an emotional overreaction but that yellow card ruined the match for me. True the boks didn’t deserve to win on the night but they were right in the game for large parts of it and missed a couple of real try scoring opportunities because they were over eager and desperate to get points on the board. They were however so stunned by that yellow card that they only came back into the match after halftime.

Team selection

The fact that boks came right back into the game the moment Ruan Pienaar came on, is no coincidence. He directed the traffic and flow a lot quicker and we were able to create openings because of that quicker ball. However we couldn’t make much of it because we didn’t have a playmaker on No12. Wynand Olivier is out of his dept and is the other main selection error that cost us this test.

These two losses against New Zealand can be traced back to last year’s end year tour when the experimentation started and it haven’t stopped yet. How many combinations and players have been tried in key positions since last year’s won in Hamilton. Think about the loose forwards, the props, the centers and the fullbacks. There was just too much messing around with players and combinations.

PdV inability to make-up his mind and his experimentation with players out of position and who have not proved themselves in the S14 cost us these two test matches. JdV was again a disaster on the wing and his only real contribution in the first half was when he slipped into the No12 slot running of Januarie’s shoulder to create Danie Rossouws try.

The breakdowns

We are not doing the little things right at the breakdowns. It is the way we go into the tackle first of all; too upright; too flat footed; not hitting with explosiveness onto the ball; not getting our hands on the ball at the moment of contact but most of all not having enough numbers at the breakdown.

We got pushed off the ball time and again because we didn’t have enough numbers quick enough at the breakdowns and because we were to upright. Mostly the supporting players were trying to pick the ball up instead of just driving over the ball and were not arriving in numbers. Richie McCaw made a few telling turnovers/stoppages at crucial times in the game re-emphasizing the value of a breakdown specialist and the way Brussow outplayed McCaw in last year tri-nation spring to mind.

Personally I am wondering whether PdV’s wheels are starting to come off. The little things –such as mentioned above- are missing in his coaching. We are playing the same opposition that the Stormers and Bulls annihilated but it seems like we are totally outclassed. What is different? The little things is missing. Add to that arrogant team selections and it is clear who need to take the blame for these disastrous performances by the most experienced Springbok side ever.

I found the following in a recently published article about the upcoming test.

Despite the All Blacks annihilating the Springboks 32-12 with their running game at Auckland’s Eden Park last weekend, assistant coach Wayne Smith has questioned whether the tourists feel the need, or have enough time, to change their tactics in the second Tri-Nations test at Westpac Stadium in Wellington on Saturday night.

Instead, he is anticipating the Boks to continue to do what they know best: employ a structured game while injecting more enthusiasm at the breakdowns and intimidation in defence.

I think he is absolutely right that is exactly what The Springboks are going to do. The Bulls have shown if we do it well it doesn’t matter whether they know what we are going to do. The article goes on and states:

Last weekend the All Blacks coaches embarrassed their South African counterparts with a free-running game plan that blossomed under the new rule interpretations.

Now the All Blacks have a vision of how they want to play, despite Smith noting they were “branded reckless and irresponsible” for the run-and-gun style they utilised in their two defeats in South Africa last year.

“We knew what we wanted to do, we knew what how we wanted to do it but we just didn’t come up to the challenge.”

He added the All Blacks coaches had an inkling the game was going to change because it was “never going to survive” under the previous laws which failed to reward attacking sides at the breakdown and resulted in a series of ugly kicking battles.

“We didn’t think it would motivate our players playing that style of rugby anyway, so we swam against the current to a certain extent.”

Yeah right. They did run with the ball and they did look flash because we allowed them to do it. We were lethargic and absent at the breakdowns.

The Kiwi game plan was essentially to take us on up front and NOT to run the ball wide.

They started to run the ball when they got accendency at the breakdowns. Nothing has changed in my opinion; the Kiwi’s don’t now suddenly have this EXPANSIVE and SUPERIOR game plan; they played just as they did last year. Only difference is that last year we competed better at the breakdowns. The new rule interpretation might help them a little this year but that made absolutely no difference during the S14. The boks were just bleddy awful last week. If we win the contest at the breakdowns, this week, they will again look reckless and irresponsible trying to run the ball.

In terms of how the boks plan to play the next test Graeme Smit had the following to say:

“It can go either way, you can change your game or you can try what you are doing better – with more passion and a different mentality.

“And I imagine that will be the route that they will take,” Smith said. “They have got the athletes and background from the Super 14 to be able to play a more expansive game. Whether they can do that in a week – we found that hard last year, so we will see.”

By making just two changes to his starting team, both forced because of suspension and injury, Springboks coach Peter de Villiers signalled he will not deviate from the strategy his men struggled to implement in Auckland.

Even though he had 13 Bulls and Stormers players – both sides proved in the Super 14 they could be deadly on attack – in his run-on side last weekend, de Villiers’ side did not enter the match with a bold attacking strategy.

They surely think they’ve got us worked out. The boks didn’t play they ball wide like the Stormers and the Bulls because they lost the battle up front; it is a simple as that; the superiority attitude that the kiwi suddenly have -after one win- infuriates the hell out of me.

The moment we start winning the contest at the breakdowns, lineouts and set piece -which in essence require mostly just more focus; we after all sit with 700 caps in that Springbok team- the boks will certainly run the ball. As a matter of fact we had 51% (according to the TV stats – the statistics on www.ruggastats.com shows that the All Blacks had 57,58% possession against South Africa’s 42,42%) of the possesion. Whether 51% or 42.4% doesn’t matter it is still enough posssesion to win a rugby match. It is what we did with the possesion that is the problem and I think we can sort that by showing-up with our minds on the game and not in lala land.

We’ve got some positional issues with Januarie not being a FdP and with JdV on the wing and we are certainly missing Frans Steyn’s boot at the back. However Januarie must start playing his own game and stop trying to be FdP; he needs to stop crabbing side ways and box kicking; he needs to get back to his direct approach -attacking the fringes and keeping the AB loosies busy and turning around-  which brought about that wonderful Dunedin try in 2008. I believe the AB are still vulnerable around the fringes as they were in 2008 and 2009. JdV defence will be better this time round and his job is to create play on the wing alla Carel du Plessis; the boks need to get the ball to JdV on the blindside wing so that he can do what he does best namely be a playmaker.   

Come on bokke get it right this time round and shuff the gloating up their backsides.

Euphoric newspaper headlines praising the Springboks as world champions were at the order in the Sunday and Monday newspapers.

In the All Black side there was no singing and partying after the test. Only a few of the team showed up at the post match reception.

Most players just sat round the lounge, morose and reflective. Vodanovich is almost heart-broken. “We’ll have to start looking for backs,” he mutters. 

The final party of the tour took place at Jannie le Roux’s house. Gielie de Kock the editor of the magazine Dagbreek accompanied the All Blacks to Jannie le Roux’s but was ordered by le Roux to leave the premises as no journalist was welcome at his place. Since his row with one of the Transvaalers reporters and his subsequent refusal to allow the Transvaler’s sports journalists into Ellis Park to report on the fourth test Le Roux received much critism and was badly drawn apart by the South Africans sport media. Colin Meads and Chris Laidlaw pointed it out to le Roux that Gielie (David write it Kieley) de Kock was there as a guest of the All Black team and if he has to leave the All Blacks will leave too. A shoulder shrug response from le Roux led to the AB departing and continuing the party in Gielie de Kock’s hotel room.

Jannie le Roux the Transvaal rugby boss who made quite a fuss about nothing. Neither the New Zealand supporters nor team or the South African media held him in high esteem.

David concludes his book with the words:

It had been a great tour. It was a successful failure in some ways. But, above all, it had been truly worth it. 

In a similar vein that David Gabriel began his book Terry McLean (the award-winning New Zealand sport journalist and author who also wrote a book about the tour with the title; Battling to boks) groans and complains extensively about the Springboks conservative style, the fact that South Africa was not prepared to play young and exciting players and the fact that AB had to play against very weak provincial sides and about the many illegal and dirty incidents on tour.

He complained as follows about the Springboks conservative style:

I do not think it can be questioned that the All Blacks in losing the war won the battle which was the sort of rugby that ought to be attempted by all teams at all levels. Their best, play, even, at times, their worst play, did have gaminess about it; it was a sport, risks were taken, and there was the infinite pleasure of something constructed. 

Is it my imagination or have I heard this recently; was it perhaps after the 2007 World Cup tournament when their “attractive” rugby caused their downfall? I think the point is rather irritating especially when one considers that the Springboks scored 6 tries versus only 3 by the All Blacks in the 1970 series.

McLean continues to steam along with this infuriating whingeing:

By contrast, the South African teams laboured. The Springboks were not initiators. They sought to unbalance and destroy the All Blacks’ rhythm and to pick up such crumbs as might fall.  A back such as Visagie, who had pretty well all the talents, including a sidestep as nimble as Nurevey’s turned himself into a kicker who in 320 minutes of the test series made only one run. It was a good one, no doubt that, but not too many risks would have been taken if he had made more attempts. I said “turned himself”. Ought I have to have said, “was turned”? 

Piet Visagie which Terry Mclean rated as an outstanding bal player with all the natural ability to be a running flyhalf but who was turned into a kicking one by SA Rugby.

McLean keep on whining while labouring an argument that the conservative and one-dimensional playing style of the Springboks also found expression in team selection. For example, someone like Mannetjies Roux -whom he disliked to the extreme and who he regard as a dirty, self-centred even mean rugby player- was chosen above brilliant playmakers such as Johan Walters (WP), Rex Greyling (Natal), Piet Cronje (Transvaal) and Andre van Staden (Northern Transvaal). Other outstanding playmakers whom he reckons should have played for the Springboks are Tonie Roux (NTVL fullback), Frannie Alberts (NTVL wing) and Hannes Viljoen (Natal wing).

Most of these players –mentioned above- did eventually play for South Africa. It is interesting that when New Zealand had a conservative approach in 1956 and 1965 against the Springboks no kiwi complained about the type of rugby that they were playing. It is well documented that the South Africa back play was far superior to that of New Zealand in 1956 and 1965 while New Zealand had the superior forward pack. Footage of the 1956 and 1965 tests shows that New Zealand’s main approach was to spoil and rush though the lineout’s; very rarely if ever did they play with their backline in both of those series. Most of the AB tries during those respective test series (1956 and 1965) resulted from South African mistakes; that is from a conservative safety first focus while South Africa was trying to play open attractive and entertaining rugby.

However in 1970 and again in 1976 (about which I am going to write next) after they lost the respective series McLean’s whingeing about South Africa being negative and conservative are the main themes that runs like barbed wire through his two books about the respective tours; they (New Zealand) lost these series (1970 and 1976) according to McLean because the adversaries played negative rugby.

I wonder whether he would have complained about the “old” players in the Springbok team if New Zealand had won the 1970 series. The fact is the Springboks of 1970 paid their school fees. A substantial amount of them did their apprenticeships on the 1965 tour and the Springboks paid the price by losing the series trying to play “attractive” rugby with young talented and exciting back. It makes absolutely no sense to then cast such players aside for new exciting young talent just in order to entertain the opposition with flap flap rugby. The young player thing was tried during the 69/70 end year tour to the UK and it was a fiasco. 

The Springboks picked a side that could play the way they needed to play to win the series. After the Griqualand-west game the Springbok selectors Ian Kirkpatrick, Daan Swiegers and coach Johan Claassen were highly concerned when they met up after the match. Ian Kirkpatrick words were: “Holy smoke, how are we going to beat these bastards?” Clearly, these wise men of SA Rugby decided on a particular strategy and selected their teams in accordance with that particular game plan. The decision was that the All Blacks should be confronted upfront and their backs should be tackled out of their rhythm.

Gabriel David (Rugby and be Damned), Terry McLean (Battling the boks) and Harding and Williams (Toughest of them all) indicate in their respective books that the “defining moment” in the 1970 series was Joggie Jansen’s tackle on Cottrell.

Harding and Williams worded it as follows:

Those who saw Joggie Jansen’s tackle on Wayne Cottrell at Loftus Versfeld still talk about it. So do those who may have been a thousand miles away listening to the match on the radio, but who have gradually came round to the view that they did in fact, see that tackle. Men still approach Jansen at rugby dinners to discuss it.

Perhaps, like all legends, it has grown in the telling. But was Jansen’s tackling really that impressive when compared to the frequent big hits of the 1990’s? The answer must be yes because he was so destructive. He seems to have had the ability and the presence to disrupt an entire opposition backline, not merely block a particular movement. His tackles were also genuinely offensive, in that the ball often went loose, to be snatched up by him or one of his team mates.

It intriques me that McLean and David admit that the Jansen-tackle -and therefore by implication the Springboks game plan- won them the series but then complains in the same sentence/breath about the type of rugby South Africa played and about the players the Springboks selected to enforce that game plan. Mannetjies Roux –who McLean clearly thought was over the hill- contributed much to Jansen’s effectiveness on defence; it was Roux who created two tries by pouncing on balls spilling loose after Jansen tackles. I wonder just how much longer will we here this lame argument from the Kiwi’s.

The most disturbing game in terms of foul play was the Eastern Transvaal game when Colin Meads got his arm fractured from a kick by Henderson while lying trapped on the ground. The most sensational incident was the Nomis McCormick incident and it was McLean who interviewed McCormick after the game and broke the story that Fergie intentionally struck Nomis with his the elbow because he would have done anything at the time to prevent a certain try. McLean included the whole interview in his book “Battling the boks”.

The following paragraph is part of that interview:

“I hit him,” says the All Black fullback, McCormick. “Of course, I never intended to knock his teeth out. But the situation was very dangerous. Nomis had to be stopped. I might even have gone as far as foot-trip him. As it was I copped him, accidentally, I might say, with my left elbow – right on the point of it.”

McCormick does not excuse his action. In fact, to be frank, I do not think there is any ground for excusing it.

Looks to me like a case of beauty is in the eye of the beholder. If the Kiwi’s won with conservative rugby then conservative rugby is good rugby and if they need to intimidate opponents in order to ascertain ascendency upfront then intimidation is acceptable just don’t do it to them. 

Alan Sutherland busy intimidating Piston van Wyk with Hannes Marais already on the way down. Eish, I thought it’s just the Springboks who used this sort of tactics.

That man Sutherland again this time jumping on Mof Myburg’s back with his knees while the game goes on in the background.

Finally, I believe the 1970 tour was of immense importance for SA rugby. This series won brought the pride and the self-belief back after Springbokrugby went through incredible lows in 1956 as well as in the years 1961 to 1965 and during the 69/70 end year tour when could not win a single test against the British Home Nations. It is this 1970 series which carried SA rugby through the isolation years and which helped us to keep the belief that we can win the World Cup. This was a massive series for South Africa and one of the reason why a player like Frik du Preez got the award as South Africa’s player of the centuary.

Johan Claassen the Springbok coach during 1970 series. Classen played in 28 tests for the Springboks (1955-1962) and coached the boks for 18 (1964-1974) tests with a success record of 55%.

Ian Kirkpatrick, one of the selectors during the 1970 series. He has played 13 tests (1953-1961), most on inside centre (two on flyhalf). In the years 1967 to 1977 he coached the Springboks in 12 tests with a 75% success record.

I knew we were in trouble the moment I saw the All Blacks running onto the field; bunched together under a blanket.

Well, about everything went wrong for the boks. It was one of those games. The AB arrived and fronted-up and we didn’t. If I must summarize, there are seven things that I think went wrong or who were not in place:

1. Fourie de Preez;
2. Inability to create pressure;
3. The breakdown;
4. Heinrich Brussow;
5. Poor tactical kicking;
6. Battle at the set piece;
7. Bakkies Botha.

Fourie du Preez

We missed FDP’s decision making, and tactical dictating and kicking enormously. There was no general on the field who could keep the forwards on the front foot and who could mix it up to create space for the backline. Januarie’s tactical kicking and option making was just poor. He cost us the first try with an aimless and extremely poorly placed box kick. How many times did we knock the ball after a pass from Januarie mostly because he passed the ball to the wrong person or were executing poorly. The reason why he gets selected only PdV will know but here is a man that could not even make the Stormers team and who does not fit the role he needs to fulfil; as he player he is almost the complete opposite from FdP.

Conrad Smit scoring after a poor box kick by Rickey Januarie.

Inability to create pressure. 

We were simply too slow off the line -both on attack and defence- with the result that we could not create pressure in both instances. You cannot create pressure with static defence or by rotating static ball on attack. I have difficulty remembering occasions where we ran with speed onto the ball. We were too upright going into contact and we did not attack space or the weak shoulder of the opposition; there was also no explosiveness on contact. The pods were static, the rucks were static and the ball recipients were standing when receiving the ball.

On defence, we mostly hung back and waited for the ball carriers instead of moving with speed off the line to defend behind the advantage line or at least to bother the receiver. The result was that we were constantly driven back at the breakdowns.

We lost the battle at the breakdown.

We came second at the breakdown because firstly we were to upright going into contact and secondly because we were too slow of the line on attack and defence.

Classic example of how we got forced back at the break downs.

Heinrich Brussow

Brussow was badly missed at the breakdown. Not one turnover in the whole match that I can remember. Go back to the 2009 matches and it obvious that Brussow was the man who created most of our turnovers; yes the rule interpretation at the breakdown has changed but Brussow is the man that went in low and either stopped the opposition’s forward momentum or created a turnover. Who did that in this test?

We had no continuity at the breakdowns on attack. Brussow played an essential role in this regard during the 2009 season. Our biggest problem this weekend was that we kept losing the bal when we went into contact mostly because we were forced bacwards. Brussow was the man that protected the ball for us in 2009 and who helped with creating explosiveness at the collisions with his low body position and leg driving when supporting at the breakdowns. Remember how we struggled with the exact same thing (having poor ascendency at the collisions and losing the ball in contact) in the test against the lions in which Brussow didn’t play.

Tactical kicking

Our tactical kicking was in a word pathetic. Morné simply kicked the ball back for Mils to launch counter attacks. The follow-up work and second- line defenders were absent but mostly the kicks were just poorly placed. One of the reasons for this was the fact that we got a thumping at the set piece and at the breakdown. The AB had us under pressure and our tactical kickers received slow bal and it is hard to follow-up on kicks if your pack is essentially on the retreat. The ball was however in my opinion not so slow that Morné could not kick the bal out or that the box kick could not have been done with more precision. Zane’s kick and run, kick and run, kick and run, kick and run (should I say it one more time) was also way to predictable; it was a case of if you try something and it doesn’t work keep trying until you doesn’t succeed.

Zane kicking again. 

Battle at the set piece.

The scrum was not too bad but we came off second best in the lineout. John Smit’s throwing was probably one reason why we lost the lineout dual 3-0 but more importantly we were constantly driven back when we tried the maul. We were just too static and pedantic. This trend of catching the bal and then standing still and organise ourselves before we try and truck and trailer was already evident during the S14. There is absolutely no explosiveness, no speed onto the bal so the AB stood back waited for us to start statically organise ourselves and then went into us at speed dislodging the bal or preventing us from getting any forward movement. We have changed the roll maul to a truck and trailer drive. The traditional roll maul somehow got lost in the process.

Don’t for one moment think this was just another Tri-Nations victory? This emphatic, impressive and quite exhilarating win by the All Blacks at Eden Park on Saturday night was so much more than that.

Running in four tries to nil, and outplaying the South Africans in their own game was a massive confidence booster for Graham Henry’s All Blacks.

It was a response that had been compulsory after the shambles of last year’s competition when the All Blacks dropped all three matches to a Boks side that succeeded in getting inside their heads.

A fourth straight defeat to these heated rivals, and a third on the trot on Kiwi soil, had been unthinkable.

The All Blacks simply had to shake off this Bok bogey that seemed to have invaded their state of mind. They had to show they could stand up to their pressure, their physical posturing and their harrying tactics; keep their cool when they had to and answer back with their own game.

Matfield lost the lineout dual 3-0

Bakkies Botha 

This monkey should be sent home and should in my opinion never again play for the Springboks. He cost us 13 points and had enough chances. He simply does not learn from his mistakes.

The repeated replay of the incident was not just in the thoughts of referee Alan Lewis, but also in the heads of players, who realised that they would be up against it for the rest of the match.

Scarcely 10 minutes after the incident, Lewis produced an extremely controversial yellow card against Botha for another offence and the Test was lost in the 10 minutes after that. The reason for that card can in all probability be found in the head butt incident and the repeated replaying of it on the big screen followed by booing from the crowd. How could the referee not been influenced by that?

Given De Villiers’ interaction with the media on Monday, it’s also clear that the Boks had difficulty too handle and recover from the incident.

“We were shaken by it. Bakkies was guilty. Let me make that clear. But there was a judicial procedure and he has been punished,” said De Villiers.

There were a few other things which also contributed to an overall awful performance like a poorly contructed reserve bench; poor use of the reserve bench as well as Jean de Villiers’s defence on the wing but that was secondary to the seven reasons outlined here, in my opinion.

Is Bakkies ashamed or asking for devine intervention?