The interesting thing about the 1965 test series against Australia is that Chris Greyvenstein does not refer to it anywhere in his book Springbok Saga; perhaps understandable considering the poor overall performance of this 1965 team in Australia. On reflection, one wonders whether it is just partisan reporting or purposely orchastrated by structuring the chapters, of his book, in such a way that he could hide Springboks disasters to some extend. Probabbly not but I couldn’t help wondering.

 

The 65 team arrived in Australia with a perception that rugby in this country was weak and were lacking depth. It was a wrong perception. Rugby in Australia went through some revolutionary changes in the early sixties due to the inspiring work of a man by the name of Norman McKenzie. This revolution was one of the primary reasons why, in 1964, Australia drew the test series with the Springboks in South Africa and gave the AB one of their biggest hidings (20-3) yet in Auckland, New Zealand.

 

Australia rugby was far from where they wanted to be and were indeed weak and underdeveloped in the vast areas of Western Australia, Victoria and Queensland, but in Sydney and surrounding areas the idea of pattern rugby had taken hold and were leading the way for the rest of the country.

 

Pattern rugby is what we, today, would refer to as 10-man rugby and was a massive step in the direction of more structure in Wallaby rugby, which until that time, were known in New Zealand as Ozzie style airy fairy rugby -today “razzle and dazzle” rugby. McKenzie, after making a thorough study of New Zealand rugby started to promote the idea of pattern rugby in Australian; that is that Australia should start playing with less freedom and more structure and discipline and precision, on the basis of strong forward play. The main trust was that Australia should reduced the freedom and frilleries in their play and start concentrating upon careful, calculated planning, the reduction of mistakes to the lowest possible number, and the development of team-play to the kind of pattern favoured for many years in New Zealand.

 

It is astounding that Springbok management did not notice these changes in Australian rugby and did not see the danger lights after Australia, in 1964, drew 2 all with the Springboks in SA; brimming with self-assured confidence South Africa took a serious nose dive when they came up against a well coached, experienced and talented Wallaby side. The thing that made the Aussies so dangerous is that they did not loose their ability to “razzle and dazzle” in the transformation process but were now able to used it selectively on the back of pattern and precise forward play.

 

The media’s first impressions of the Springboks in Australia were that they were a very good team with speed, and deception. In the first 3 matches against Western Australia (Perth, 2 matches) and Victoria (Melbourne, 1 game), the Springboks started with a “hiss and a roar” achieving proper wins against teams with relatively weak packs and weak defensive patterns. McLean, after the first two matches in Perth, wrote: I confess to being shaken by the possibilities in each of these teams. The average pace was high. Even better was the backing up.

 

He writes that the defence of the opposition teams were weak but that the Spingbok’s instinct for backing-up, for being in the right place at the right time, seemed to be keenly developed. Hannes Marias played in both matches (in Perth) because Abie Malan hadn’t yet caught-up with the team. The Springboks won the first game with a score of 60-0 and the second game with 102-0. Almost all the players had good matches but McLean mentioned a few who he thought were outstanding such as Tommy Bedford, Jannie Engelbrecht, Frik du Preez and Keith Oxlee.

 

Kerneels Cronje -Eastern Transvaal wing- was particularly impressive until he got injured in the 58th minute of the first game. Terry McLean writes about Kerneels Cronje as follows: Cornelius Cronje looked the most exciting and promising back in the team of the unofficial match on opening day in Perth. His speed -100 yards in 9.8 s- and a strong surging swerve suggested that he could be the sensation of the tour.

 

Cronje however never recovered from the “injury”. After many treatments and medical assessments, during which no real injury could be identified, and after an unsuccessful attempt to get back on the field in Christchurch, he was sent home and replaced by Eben Olivier

 

The second official game (the 102-0 win in Western Australia was not an official game) was against Victoria in Melbourne. The Springboks won the game with ease 52-0 against weak opposition. It was after this game that Brain Palmer, a Wallaby in the 1920′s, noted that this Springbok team has the potential to be one of the best teams of all time as they have pace and deceitfulness. The ability of the forwards and backs to combine on attack, with good support play, by running themselves in position, to see space, to anticipate was the things that mostly impressed the critics. Bedford’s speed and support play, Nomis’s acceleration and speed of the mark, Barnard’s nimble deceitfulness and decision making, Du Preez’s power and overall game and Truter’s willingness to be involved and to find work from the wing, were in general things that stood out.

 

One theme, can however be found like a golden thread in Terry McLean,s narrative (The bok busters) namely the Springboks lights and unstructured practice sessions and specifically their tendency to neglect scrummaging, rucks and lineout’s during practice. The emphasis was on run and ran again with the ball. McLean’s impressions are insightful:

 

Mostly running was done at practice. Everybody ran around, all the time, until, at the end, there was some scrummaging which did not manage to look authoritative. Only twice in all this scampering, which lasted the best part of 90 minutes, did I see a man deliberately fall down with the ball to permit a ruck to form over him in the time-honored New Zealand way.

 

This negligence or absence of forward play during practice sessions, had a major impact on the results of the series against Australia and also cost South Africa the test series against New Zealand. The wheels came off the first time the Springboks came up against a team with a solid and thoroughly drilled forward pack. This happened four days after arrival; the deficiencies in the Springbok team of 65 were clearly highlighted when they played and lost 3-12 against New South Wales -which contained 14 players playing for the Wallabies at the time- in Sydney.

 

The inexperience of Springbok forwards and the lack of substantial scrum, lineout and rucking at practice were clearly demonstrated by their inability to cope with the aggressive and intimidating forward play of the Sydney team. There were no tough guy’s (brekers of ysters) in the Springbok team who could sort the bullies in the opposing team. The worst was that management and senior players could not see the reason for the loss or identify the problem areas and rectify it. The problems were clear to see for every one with half an idea about rugby. Terry McLean sum it up in one paragraph:

 

So my catalogue of Springbok weaknesses would include line-out incompetence, want of zest in following the ball, certain slowness in pass by de Villiers, ominous air of careful consideration to Oxlee’s play and, outside, the most ghastly number of mishandelings and dropped passes, with a special mark against Gainsford.

 

It was obvious within not more than 15 minutes that the Springboks were in for a licking. The statistics said that New South Wales won the lineouts by 36 to 25 and because they were statistics they probably right. But the immediate memory is that the Springboks scarcely ever won the ball.

 

Dawie de Villiers, according to McLean had “a certain slowness in pass”. Here, de Villiers is caught with the ball in one of the tour matches in New Zealand.

 

The halves (no 9 and 10) as well as the playmakers at centre struggled in this match -being under constant pressure- as a result of the pack being on the back foot. McLean was of the opinion that none of the Springbok forwards weighed up to the class of the Sydney team and were totally overshadowed by the forwards in the New South Wales team. He was in particular appalled by the lack of zest; the poor defence; the neglect to follow-up and the general lethargy demonstrated by the Springboks. As previously mentioned 14 of the players in the New South Wales side also played for the Wallabies in the first test, the next Saturday.

 

 

Keith Oxlee. About Oxlee Terry McLean wrote: After being enormously impressed with Oxlee’s class at Perth, I now saw, that the man had become an old hand who was not prepared to die for South Africa.

 

John Gainsford. About Gainsford McLean writes: Good-looking, charming, almost over confident, a glamour boy to the world’s press. He has reached a stage of believing his own press cuttings.

 

Kobus Louw had been hoping that the team would all go to the airport to welcome Abie Malan arriving form South Africa. The idea was that it would strengthen team unity, forge the bonds of brotherhood and so on. McLean wrote: But Sydney girls are among the world’s most attractive, and I am afraid that some of the boys, way-laid themselves rather than answer the call of the Bugle.

 

Speaks volumes doesn’t it? First, the manager “hoped” for something instead of the manager decided; here we have a team who had just lost their first tour match and there is no reflection, no remorse and no unhappiness; more important was the “Seedney gieels”

 

Next session, the two test matches against Australia.

There was significant pressure from various quarters within New Zealand to stop the tour. David provides background of several internal political and local events in New Zealand –that most South Africans were not even aware off- that almost stopped the tour.

 

Here, a march against the 1970 All Black tour to South Africa leaves Victoria University in Wellington.

 

The resistance against rugby tours to South Africa gained momentum in the early 1960’s when the NZ Rugby Union capitulated to send an “all white” team to South Africa. The 1960 tour was approved by a small minority of board members and there was an unspoken agreement between council members on the NZ Rugby Board that the 1960 team would be the last all white team that New Zealand will send to the republic.

 

In 1965, Danie Craven and other SA rugby board members left the impression in NZ that the next invitation for a New Zealand rugby team to visit SA will contain no race specifications.

 

This was received with much hope and anticipation in New Zealand as David explains: It was a period of great hope and expectation. Until that climatic morning on Monday 6 September 1965, when the South African Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior announced that Maori would not be welcomed in 1967.

 

The invitation for the All Blacks to South Africa was received in mid-February 1966. On 25 February the NZRFU reacted by stating that the New Zealand Rugby Football Union could not under the terms of the invitation, see its way clear to send an All Black side in 1967.

 

This resulted in a year of much speculation and hopeful expectation that things will be sorted and that the South African government wil reverse its stance and reword the terms of the invitation. In April 1968 it was announced that the All Blacks were invited for a tour to South Africa without any race specifications. David put it as follows: The news was released to the world and everyone rejoiced”. The tour had the support of the NZRFU but the New Zealand’s announcement of acceptance gave rise to a sequence of incidents, actions and demonstrations which left no doubt that not everyone in NZ were happy with proceedings.

 

The global sports boycott against South Africa started to get international stature and momentum in the early 60’s and was beginning to show its teeth at this stage; various action groups against race segregation began to appear in NZ and jumped on the global sport boycott wagon. Associations or action groups that specifically sprung to life as a result of the envisaged tour were associations like CARE (Citizens Association for Racial Equality) and HART (Halt All Racist Tours Association) and a youth movement among the students called Pym (The Progressive Youth Movement).

 

The Pym held a big conference in Hamilton early in February of 1969. A manifesto to stop the tour was released; included in that document was a plan to campaign the country for signatures in support of a petition to parliament. The aim was to sample at least 100 000 signatures of support against the tour. In the end they got only 19 609 signatures.

 

Within this time, Christchurch also submitted a bid to house the 1974 Commonwealth Games and there was consternation in NZ, when some of the black African countries indicated they will oppose the bid if the Rugby tour were to proceed. The chairman of the Christchurch Commonwealth Games bid, however, took a stand and made it clear he and his committee felt the tour should proceed even if that should have a negative impact on Christchurch’s chance to get the vote.

 

Shortly after, this the powerful Federation of Labour entered the battle and made it clear that they will withdraw all services, including aircraft maintenance and refuelling, if the All Black tour were to proceed. In David’s words: This was the week where even the most ardent rugby men became apprehensive about the tour. The crisis was, however, overcome when a rift threatened to developed within the labour union circles if the union went through with the resolution. The Federation of Labour subsequently withdrew their resolution and announced that no action would be taken against the tour.

 

Respect and support for the anti-tour movement received a major blow when a bomb was thrown through a window and exploded on May 25, 1968 in the Auckland rugby clubhouse. A wave of anger and disillusionment swept through the country as a result of that and the tour gained much support and the general feeling was that the tour was now a definite reality.

 

There were a few demonstrations at the All Black trials but mostly there were more policemen than protesters and the trials went smoothly and without any noteworthy incidents. The anti-tour movement did receive some further support when Ken Gray an All Black prop announced he had retired from the game because he always had moral reservations about touring to South Africa.

 

Then came a masterful move by a bookseller in Wellington by the name of Roy Parsons. Parson summoned a court order against the All Black captain, coach and team management under an ancient law “Ne Exeat Regno“.  The writ sought to restrain them from leaving the jurisdiction of the country on the grounds that it would be detriment to the country. David put it as follows: It was a masterly piece of legal intricacy, indeed a noble last-minute effort to stop the tour. One could only admire the Ingenuity of it all. The writ invoked the 14^th century law of “ne exeat regno” (not leaving the realm).

 

 

 

The case was heard in the Supreme court in Wellington on 8 June. The hearing lasted for nearly 6 hours and the lay mind boggled at the involved argument, not to mention the 37 law books of impressive size and importance that covered the tables of the two counsels. The request was denied after many debate on grounds of absence of clear authority or precedent.  It was the last legal obstruction to the tour.

 

Approximately 300 demonstrators arrived at the airport on the day the plane left, and there were fears of a bomb in the aircraft but the AB’s boarded the plane in spite of this scary threat and there were no problems with the takeoff and flight.

 

Next week more on the arrival in SA and the first tour match.

 

Four Maori’s who went on the 1970 All Black tour to South Africa. 

A while ago I came upon a gem of a book in a second hand bookstore here in NZ. The book is about the 1970 All Black tour to South Africa entitled “Rugby and be Dammed” written by G.R. David. What made the book so unique and interesting, for me, is the fact that it provides a New Zealand perspective on the whole tour and subsequently contains information that I as a South African have not heard or read before. David was a sport journalist for the “Evening Post” a newspaper in NZ and was the official New Zealand journalist on the tour. A brief description of each game are provided in the book, including the preparation for the various matches as well as quite insigtfull after match perceptions by the touring party.

 

Since discovering and reading this book I have bought three more books on the 1970 rugby tour, written by New Zealand journalists and sport writers.

 

My plan is to post on a weekly basis some interesting pieces on the respective tour matches here on my blog, combining information from at least four sources. This will coincide with posts on the 1965 tour.  In 1970 I was 8 years old and my hope is that some of the older generation rugby supporters in South Africa -who attended or listened to these matches- will pitch in and share their memories with us.

 

Gabriel David begins his book with the following statement: 

 

“How can you evaluate a rugby tour that was as much a failure as it was certainly a success? The All Blacks have rewritten the record books in South Africa but for one and that was winning the series. How can you make a fair and honest appraisal and reach a conclusion about a side that won every provincial match yet still managed to lose the series 1-3“

 

He stresses the fact that no ambiguity should exist that NZ has sent their best 30 players on tour. The team was without doubt the best (of all possible New Zealand rugby sides) which toured South Africa up to that that stage. This was a side that has been unbeaten for 17 consecutive tests stretching over 5 years since the fourth test against the 1965 Springbok team.

 

He then asked the question:

 

“How could such a great touring side lose 1-3 in a series against a Springbok team that would never rate as the best New Zealand opposition has faced in the last 5 years?“

 

David then explains what he think were the reason(s) for the series loss. The first issue he addresses is injuries to key players and arising from that shocking team selection decisions by the New Zealand selectors. He specifically refers to the omission of Wayne Cottrell after the lost in the first test and express the opinion that the selectors went a little panicky after the third test when they omitted experienced players like AJ Wyllie, MJ Dick and Fergie McCormick.

 

Another major reason for the series loss in his opinion was the fact that the All Black had it too easily in the tour matches. He put it as follows:

 

“They had it too easy in most of the games and there was a relaxation in the basic skills. Tackling became a lost art because the tourists were seldom called on to set up defensive screens. They were suffering from delusions of grandeur. They were winning so handsomely that they disregarded the fundamentals of the game and indulged in fancy patterns that had too many loose threads. “

 

According to him, the perception of many South African, that there is depth in Springbokrugby is wrong and he goes on to state that he believes that a large gap exists between national and provincial rugby in South Africa.

 

Provincial rugby in SA is bad, negative and unimaginative so much so that the All Blacks had little trouble to completely destroy virtually all the provincial sides they played on tour. These provincial teams have too easily and quickly complained about so-called foil and dirty tactics and especially about the All Blacks standard practice to step on or ruck obstructing opposition players away at the break downs.

 

He concludes that Springbok side consists of a “team of oldies’ and that South Africa should be concerned (rather than euphoric) about the state of their rugby and their lack of depth in certain positions.

 

I think in SA few would have agreed with him in 1970 but in 1972 the correctness of his observation came true when a Springbok side full of new faces lost against John Pullin’s England team. And two years later it was an absolute nightmare when the Lions of 1974 toured unbeaten through South Africa not losing a single match on top of winning the first three test matches and drawing the last one.

 

The 1970 All Black touring side to South Africa

 

Chris Greyvenstein refers in his book (Springbok Saga) to the period 1961 to 1969 as the turbulent years. A accurate description because this decade in South African rugby was indeed turbulent in more than one way.

 

According to Terry McLean the 1965 team was the worst Springbok team ever to visit New Zealand. Weak indeed as a team, judged by contests won and lost, but if we look at the individuals in the team (see photo opposite and a list of players), the team consisted of really talented players, including some of the best known and biggest Springbok legends.

 

The 1965 team

 

There was a good blend between experience and youth. Players such as Lionel Wilson have already played 21 tests, at that stage and there was Doug Hopwood (19 tests), John Gainsford (24 tests), Lofty Nel (4 tests), Keith Oxlee (17 tests) and Abie Malan (14 tests). Most of them played in the 1960 series against the All Blacks in SA. Other players like Mannetjies Roux, Tommy Bedford and Frik du Preez either played in the 60/61 end year tour to the UK or against Australia in 1961 and/or against the 1962 British Lions.

 

Young players like Syd Nomis, Jan Ellis, Dawie de Villiers, Tiny Naude and one of the better fly halfs produced by South African rugby namely Jannie Barnard also entered the test arena in 1965, some like Dawie de Villiers and Jannie Barnard already had a few tests under the belt. There were also several former Springbok captains in the team; Nelie Smith (Smith was Springbok captain in 1964 against a touring Welsh team) and Abie Malan captained the Springboks four times in test matches. Clearly not a totally inexperienced team and it was not bad players. It is therefore hard to not wonder what went wrong on the 1965 tour.

 

List of players and positions in which they were selected for the tour

 

Turbulence can also be described as turmoil and it was certainly a feature of SA rugby during the decade 1960 to 1970. There was turmoil in many ways, including such aspects as government interference with team selection, broederbond inspired appointments of team managers and captains, too many “chiefs” and too few “Indians” on and off the field as well as ongoing fights between Danie Craven and the national party. The captaincy in the years 1961 to 1964 shifted on several occasions between players like Avril Malan, Abie Malan and Nelie Smit.

 

These previous “captains” and the experienced Doug Hopwood were, however, overlooked for the 1965 tour and captaincy was awarded to a young smooth mouth theology student Dawie de Villiers, who simply did not have the stature, respect, and leadership experience at that stage to maintain and control outspoken senior players like former captain Abie Malan.

 

Discipline, dedication and focus became a increasingly larger problem as the tour proceeded with not only some prima donnas like John Gainsford and Jannie Engelbrecht in the touring group but also individualists like Mannetjies Roux who simply followed their their own heads, on and off the field, at critical stages and moments during the tour.

 

Doug Hopwood (1960-1965) experienced Springbok no 8 who were seen by some as a possible captain for the 1965 team. Hopwood played his entire career (22 tests) with a chronic back injury. His back injury prevented him form playing for large portions of the 65 tour.

 

On top of all this Hennie Muller-which actually was supposed to be the coach- had no status with his appointment and title of assistant manager, Muller, an introvert and a man who led with deeds and not with words, was totally swamped by the multitude strong and outspoken personalities in the team. See Hennie Muller’s body language on the team photo, on one of the the other team photos I have Muller actually leans away from and Dawie de Villiers; it is well known that a break developed between De Villiers and Muller during the tour (more on this later).

 

Terry McLean begins his book (The Bok busters) with the following comments:

 

The team of 30 players (who left on the 1965 tour) were inheritors of the tradition of universal supremacy established by many great Springbok teams since the first overseas tour of the United Kingdom in 1906 and several of the foremost among them had been members of the tour of the British Isles and France in 1960-61 which reaffirmed the place of their country at the head of the competitive rugby nations of the world.

 

It was, therefore, in a mood much more of decision than of hope that the team set out from Johannesburg for an arduous program of 30 matches involving at least 25.000 miles of travel. Ergo, they were going to prove worthy of their predecessors and in the tradition of South African rugby.

 

… on September 18, a few hours after the fourth international with the All Blacks of New Zealand. Much wine was spilled and intermittently, there was song and laughter. But it was the jollification of bewilderment and despair rather than the common expression of joy common to a happy band of footballing brothers who have completed a long and difficult assignment.

 

In a program of 30 matches, they had lost eight. Worse in six internationals, two against the Wallabies of Australia and four against the All Blacks of New Zealand, they had lost five.

 

So what went wrong? Here are some aspects which I believe contributed to SA’s poorest display on a tour to New Zealand:

 

Team selection issues

 

Thirteen new Springboks were selected for the tour; 17 players still playing in 1963 (in a series against Australia, in SA) and in 1964 (against Wales and France) and who was part of a short tour in April 1965 to Ireland and Scotland lost their places in the team.

 

Players who were permanently and temporary replaced:

 

Permanently lost their places and then never again Springbok	Province, position and tests played	Temporarily lost their place  but later re-elected	Position and number of caps in 1965
Dave Stewart (1960-65) Stompie v / d Merwe (1960-64) Fanie Kuhn (1960-65) Avril Malan (1960-65) Snowy Suter (1965) Dick Putter (1963) GD Cilliers (1963) Poens Prinsloo (1963) RA Hill (1960-63) Norman Riley (1963) Wang Wyness (1962-63)	WP (12) – 11 tests NTVL (5) – 5 tests TVL (1) – 19 tests TVL (5) – 10 tests Natal (7) – 2 tests WTVL (3) – 3 Tests OFS (14) – 3 Tests NTVL (8) – 1st test Rhod (2) – 7 tests OP (10) – 1 test WP (12) – 5 tests	Mike Lawless Mof Myburg Gawie Carelse Cora Dirksen Dirk de Vos Piet Uys	WP (10) – 1 test NTVL (1) – 4 tests OP (4) – 4 tests NTVL (11) – 4 tests WP (9) – 1st test (NTVL (9) – 10 tests

 

Turbulent indeed judged by the number of players who came and went during the period 1963 to 1965.

 

New or first time Springboks selected for the 1965 tour: CJ Mulder (OTVL-fullback), Kerneels Cronje (OTVL – wing); G Brynard (WP – wing), Syd Nomis (TVL – center); Eben Olivier (WP – center); LJ Slabber (OFS – no 8) Jan Ellis (SWA – flank) PH Botha (TVL – lock); A Janson (WP – lock); CP Goossen (OFS – lock); WH Parker (OTVL – prop), JP van Zyl (OVS – prop), Andy McDonald (Rhod – prop).

 

Six new selections in the tight five (locks and props) while proven front rowers such as Fanie Kuhn, Mof Myburg and Dick Putter as well as experienced locks like Stompie v/d Merwe, Avril Malan and Gawie Carelse were left at home. In major test matches, it is your experienced senior players in the tight five who has to stand up and do the job if you want win. Three props, Parker, van Zyl and Andy McDonald and one lock played in their debut tests on this tour. Jan Ellis was another debutant in the tests while a player like Frik du Preez were tossed around between flank and lock.

 

Not hard to see how team selection had a negative impact on performance during this tour.

 

Appointment of the team manager

 

Kobus Louw was appointed as manager under a cloud of criticism. As manager of the 1959 junior Springbok team Louw applied much control and disciplinary measures and were heavily critisized afterwards by players and the media. He clearly compensated for the critism by going to the other end of the fulcrum abdicating decision making to the tour committee.

 

Louw was a very popular man among the New Zealanders. McLean writes as follows about Kobus Louw:

 

It would be fair to say no manager of a touring team in New Zealand has made a more favorable impression on the public. As an executive, his image was not quite so bright.

 

He disliked to exercise too much direct responsibility and on more important issues greatly desired to submit matters to his Soviet, the Tour Committee.

 

Quite plainly, he did not like to crack the whip. Perhaps the tour would have been more successful if he had.

 

Marginalization of senior players and the designation of a young inexperienced Dawie de Villiers as captain

 

The tour was doomed to failure the moment the selectors appointed the captain and the vice captain. Involuntary one wonders who was the selectors and what went on in their heads when they decided to appoint Dawie de Villiers as captain and Nellie Smith (also a scrumhalf) as Vice Captain above former captains like Abie Malan and Avril Malan not to mention the experienced loose forward Doug Hopwood – who was written up by some journalists as a potential captain.

 

De Villiers a 25-year-old seventh-year theology student had played only 3 tests at that stage, he was unfamiliar with the traditions and modus operandi of Springbokrugby and his tactical knowledge was suspicious and he was inexperienced as captain.

 

Abie Malan – an outspoken character who did not know how to guard his tongue – was consequently a destructive influence; talking too much during matches and taking over at team practice with the result that Hennie Muller was completely marginalized and underutilized.

   

Abie Malan on the roll during one of the tour matches. Malan’s tendency to want to take over; his inability to guard his mouth caused problems from the start. After Malan lost his place in the Test side he become increasingly withdrawn.

 

No official appointment of a coach

 

Hennie Muller was certainly supposed to be the coach but with his appointment as assistant manager he did not have the status and authority of a coach neither did he act like one.

 

About Hennie Muller; Terry McLean wrote:

 

He was extremely consciencious, he had the quality of total recall which had characterized many of the foremost coaches I have known and after every game he was able to dissect the play of every player.

 

This was valuable. Because of modesty or natural self-effacement, however, he seemed wanting in the dynamism associated with great coaches and there were times during the tour when the impression was strong that he was not a happy man.

 

He, or someone else, perhaps Kobus Louw, perhaps the tour committee, was at fault in allowing players notably Abie Malan, to have much too great a say at practices. One suspect, with cause, that he would have liked to run the team much harder at training, but could not win support for his ideas.

 

I have footage of the second Test match and it is clear to me that this team was not properly coached. The lineout play, scrumaging and back line play had no structure. The ball was deflected in the line-outs and the AB stormed through at will and Nellie Smit – a slow-scrumhalf- were put under tremendous pressure which he could not handle. New Zealand tries came from kick though ball at the line out. In fact New Zealand’s main focus was to destruct and spoil; they produced very little constructive rugby in that test.

 

Leadership and ability to read the game and make adjustments were totally absent in this second test, not once did the Springbok team try to take the ball in and drive from the line-outs; no effort to ruck and maul from the line-out or to run starter moves and/or set-up play with a forward receiving the bal from 9 or 10 and driving it up to set-up second phase play; tactical kicking were poor; defense even worse. 

 

Hennie Muller uninvolved, passive and unhappy next to the the field during the fourth test.

 

Tour plan, and injuries to key players

 

Not only were the relationships between the captain and Hennie Muller difficult, complex and exhausting but the tour plan was difficult and exhausting and the Springboks found the weather, playing surfaces, and referees difficult and exhausting.

 

McLean writes:

 

At least three of the four men -Bedford, Hopwood, Botha and Nomis-  worst hit by injuries could have affected the outcome of the first two tests.

 

The team was rushed to soon in Australia into what was, in effect, a test match, that is an encounter with New South Wales, which contained 14 of the 15 successful players of the Wallabies team of the first test a few days later. This match was played six days after arrival in Australia.

 

Refereeing was an even greater problem for the South Africans and it is significant that in the three matches, whom they lost in Australia no fewer than 30 of the 42 points scored by local teams were obtained from penalty goals.

 

In New Zealand a much greater difficulty was posed by the weather. July and August were abdominally wet months, the worst in a generation, if not in all time and the sodden Springboks splashed from one field to another to play in conditions as disparate from those in South Africa as New Zealanders would find it if they were transported to the South Poles.

 

A further difficulty was travel, for Cook Strait was crossed no fewer than eight times and the Springboks zoomed up and down New Zealand like yo-yos.

 

Impact and success of the 1950-51 team in SA rugby

 

The extraordinary achievements and success of the 1950-51 Springboks captained by Hennie Muller -who on their tour to Britain and France lost just one game against London Counties- had a decisive influence on Springbokrugby. The 50-51 team -easily the best Springbok team ever to visit the United Kingdom’s- primary trait, and strength was the ability of their forwards to run with the ball. This had a negative impact on the way rugby envolved in South Africa. McLean writes:

 

An insidious disease of superficiality, it was said, entered South African rugby, and this brought about it was contended, the defeat of the Springboks of 1964 by France during a short tour and, worse, the incredibly ill stared expedition of the Springboks of 1965 who in five matches in Ireland and Scotland were beaten four times and drew once.

 

The stigma of apartheid and the 1956 tour

 

This team has made an effort to be media and public-friendly. They were so “eager to please”, so willing to be accepted that it even occured a little over the top. It is not impossible that this was a reaction against the stigma of apartheid and the legacy of the 1956 touring team to New Zealand. The 1956 touring team with Craven as coach was exceedingly competitive and for them performance on the field was more important than popularity. Terry McLean wrote as follows:

 

Compared with the team of 1956, whose members could be, and often were, anti-social in their attitude toward the players or the Opposing team, the players of 1965 were angelically companionable. They could and did take wine with opponents and this installed in them that high niche of the New Zealand Rugby which is reserved for “real good jokers.” They took a loss better than any team I have ever known.

 

Bluntly, the Springboks were too popular for their own good. It would be wrong to impute that the ’65 Springboks spent so much time having a good time that they forgot their duty as tourists and their reason for being on tour. By and large they made an excellent impression in New Zealand.

 

McLean speculates that the team might have been trying to change the image that New Zealand had of South African rugby players. Personally, I think there simply was not enough leaders in the group. Winners in my opinion is not good losers. Good losers are people who do not believe enough in themselves; winners are concerned with winning and not with being accepted, they are not “nice guy’s”.

 

It is my opinion that the Springbok selectors, Kobus Louw and Dawie de Villiers should ultimately bear the blame for the pathetic performances on the pitch during the 1965 tour. McLean writes on page 26 in his book “The bok busters“:

 

It seems to me that the few days following the defeat by Wellington doomed the Springboks. I had come to believe that the team, especially the forwards were not being worked hard enough either to counter the enervating effect of hotel life and food to build assurance and timing in basic plays.

 

He goes further and explains how on the Tuesday after the loss against Wellington only 12 players arrived at team practice because the players, according to de Villiers, was fit enough. Hennie Muller – an advocate of fitness was the only man on tour who could have established traditional Springbok practices, procedures and conduct but he was not supported by Louw and de Villiers; marginalized and “over rule” when it came to tactical decisions, practice sessions and basic house rules such as what is permissible and what is not.

 

The Springboks discovered the young womanhood of New Zealand to be fascinated by their strength and size and social manners and responded with gallantry which absorbed many of the hours which might have been devoted to rugby; this was never addressed by team management; rugby was never confirmed as the first priority. It is no coincidence that just after Danie Craven arrived in New Zealand the Springboks unexpectedly won the third test and played some of their best rugby on the tour. Craven’s mere presence resulted in greater discipline and dedication.

This blog is about the Springbok and All Black rugby rivalry. I will be discussing South Africa and New-Zealand rugby tours. Starting of with the 1965 Springbok tour to New Zealand.

 

The Springboks and the All Blacks have played against each other since 1921, when South Africa toured for the first time to New Zealand. There were a total of 13 tours -6 tours to New Zealand and 7 tours to South Africa including 1996.

 

Tours to New Zealand	Outcome	Tours of SA	Outcome
1921 1937 1956 1965 1981 1994	1 each + draw 3-1 – SA 3-1 – NZ 3-1 – NZ 3-1 – NZ 3-0 – NZ + draw	1928 1948 1960 1970 1976 1984 (Cavaliers) 1996	2 each 4-0 – SA 2-1 – SA + draw 3-1 – SA 3-1 – SA 3-1 – SA 3-1 – NZ

 

It is well known that the Springboks were ahead in terms of number of tests won until their post-apartheid return to the international arena. For 35 years (1921 to 1956) NZ were unable to win a series against South Africa and it took them 75 years to win a series against the Springboks in SA. Obviously, it can leave the impression that the Springboks were in general the better team. Apart from two series, namely 1937 and 1948, during which the boks relatively dominated SA was hardly the undisputed better team.

 

Partisan and controversial referee decisions, political interference, fighting, ear biting intimidation and sensational on and off the field incidents, were all part of these tours and make it fascinating reading. Each tour has a “defining moment” and the result of a series was often determined by one moment of individual brilliance. Each tour had players who stood out and players who did not cope.

 

The 1956 tour is certainly the one that was the biggest for New Zealand. The whole of New Zealand was incited because at that time SA was the only country against whom they have never won a Test series. The 1948 series white wash of 4-0 was still hurting and totally unprepared for what they would encounter Danie Craven’s 1956 team entered a cauldron of obsessive rugby-mania. Craven was almost worshiped, but enemy number 1; with his no nonsense straight and to the point approach he rose to the occasion and played a massive role in a series which is still fixed and ingrained in the memory of the New Zealand rugby public.

 

Over the past few months I have sampled as much information about the rugby tours between SA and NZ in the form of newspaper archives articles, books and video material as I could lay my hands on. The rugby museum here in Palmerston North, the local library and University Library was sources of great help and I have sampled information which would be hard to come by for most people.

 

The interesting nature of the information has kept me up daily reading nonstop long after midnight. To truly appreciate the tours you have to read the full story, the team selection, the arrival, the first tour match, every game’s progression and drama as well as the tension and mental games preceding the first test including the opinions of sport journalists before and after the respective tests. I will try to share this information here on my blog with anyone interested; starting with tours to NZ.

 

I’ll start with the 1965 tour to New Zealand and the 1970 tour to South Africa. From 1965 I will work backwards until 1921 then I will jump forward to 1981 and 1994. Then I discuss tours to SA.

 

As a child I have devoured Chris Greyvenstein’s book Springbok Saga, but was very frustrated with the concise nature of the information contained therein. This is therefore something that I have threatened to do for years because I have always had a desire to know the story behind the tours; to know more about the players, coaches, game plans, how the week games went and how the New Zealanders experienced the tour. Who were the key figures? Why did the 1937 team succeed while no other Springbok team could win a series in NZ? What went wrong in 1965 and did Kevin Skinner really had such a big influence on the outcome of the 1956 tour.

 

I am writing these pieces mostly for my personal collection. Inputs, stories and anecdotes from readers will certainly be appreciated.